48 Md. App. 231 - Athanason v. Athanason’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In determining the legislative intent, we examine the words used as the primary source for discovering that intent ... If the words are clear and unambiguous, generally speaking, the search for the legislative intent ends.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Walsh v. Walsh · 57 Md. App. 662 - Dobbyn v. Dobbyn

2. “We think the words “cases filed after January 1, 1979,” contained in Section 2 of Chapter 794, supra, are quite plain, sensible and free from ambiguity. Appellee filed the original case prior to January 1, 1979. When she filed her supplemental bill in this same case after January 1, 1979, it became a part of the original case. The fact that the supplemental bill may set out a different “cause of action”, as appellee maintains, is immaterial. The statute refers not to “causes of action” but to “cases”, and we hardly think it needs citation to establish that the two are not synonymous: a cause of action is not necessarily a case, while a case must contain at least one, and often contains several, causes of action. And a supplemental bill is not a case. In our view the Legislature’s choice of language here constitutes a clear expression of its intention to limit the effect of the “Property Disposition In Divorce and Annulment” Act to actual cases filed after the Act’s effective date, (emphasis supplied)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 70 Md. App. 1 - Miller v. Miller

3. “cardinal rule” to be followed in applying a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the real legislative intent. In seeking to determine the legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute itself. If the words contained therein are plain and unambiguous, and if they express a definite and sensible meaning, then their meaning is conclusively presumed to be that intended by the Legislature... The act in question simply states that”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 53 Md. App. 271 - In Re Michael W.