dissent">Judge Arnold

dissenting.

I dissent. While I believe the majority decision correctly interprets the holding of this court in State v. Simmons, supra, I believe Simmons is wrongly decided. The plain language of G.S. §8-40 does allow the jury to compare writings for genuineness, and I find nothing else in our rules of evidence to require that the j ury must be aided by expert testimony. Other j urisdictions, and apparently a majority, permit the trier of facts to make handwriting comparisons without the aid of experts. Moreover, I find the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Houston, 153 N.W. 2d 267, 269 (1967), to be sound:

Whatever may have been the experience and competence of common-law jurors to assess the genuineness of signatures, we are of the opinion that this aptitude is one which today most laymen have been obliged to develop in *245conducting their own affairs. With the widespread use of credit cards and travelers’ checks, merchants and others in the field of commerce are frequently confronted with the necessity of comparing signatures. In the light of this common experience and exposure, we hold that a factfinder may, in the discretion of the court, be permitted to resolve the issue of forgery without expert assistance. Under our law it is not incumbent on jurors to accept an expert’s opinion blindly. They must come to their conclusion on the basis of their own observations and experience and assessment of all the evidence before them. Backman v. Fitch, 272 Minn. 143, 155, 137 N.W. 2d 574, 582.

Therefore, I vote to find no error.

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