48 Tex. 491

Teal v. Terrell

Decided July 1, 1878

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1878-07-01

Appeal from Victoria. Tried below before the Hon. T. C. Barden. This suit was brought August 30, 1872, by C. L. Terrell, John W. Stevenson, and his wife Frances, who, before her intermarriage with Stevenson, was the widow of Barnes Simms, deceased, and by James, Marcellus, Robert, and Alice Simms, and against Anna Teal, who is the widow of Peter Teal, deceased, and against the children of said Peter and Anna, viz., Mary, Kate, James Teal, and Julia Teal Murphy, with her husband. John B. Sideck, from whom both parties derive title, obtained two grants, each for-a league of land. One grant was made by the government of Coahuila and Texas in 1830; the other was made to him in 1834, as a colonist of Power and Hewitson’s colony. The first grant was for what is called “ the square league ”; the other was for what is called “ the long league.” Both fronted on the San Antonio river. The long league ran across the square one, and extended back behind it. Sideck died between 1842 and 1846, leaving one child and heir, Mrs. Sevier. Peter Teal was Sideck’s nephew; and after Sideck’s death he occupied a part of his land, which part lay within the “ long league ” grant, and was supposed to be also entirely included within the lines of the “ square league” grant, and nearly all of it was in fact so included. Teal claimed this land, or an interest in it, by donation from Sideck. Teal died about 1846, and in that year Mrs. Sevier brought suit, by trespass to try title, against Mrs. Teal, his widow and administratrix, to recover the land. Mrs. Teal pleaded not guilty and prescription; but the defense specially set up, and the only one relied on, was that the land belonged to Sideck’s estate; that Sideck acquired it by the two grants aforesaid, of 1830 and 1834; and that Sideck, by deed of donation, in December, 1832, had given the land in equal shares to Peter Teal and to his (Sideck’s) daughter, the plaintiff, and that thereby Peter Teal became entitled to the undivided one-half of the land. She then prayed for partition, and that in the division there might be assigned to the plaintiff the part she had occupied and cut timber upon, &c., and to herself might be assigned the part that included her homestead, &c. This deed of donation was made in 1832, when Sideck held only the square league. The land described in plaintiff’s petition appears to be the “ long league ”; but after this answer was put in, the litigation appears to have been confined to the question whether Teal was entitled to half the square league by virtue of that donation. The defendant admitted that the plaintiff was Sideck’s legitimate daughter, and admitted that the grants of 1830 and 1834 vested in Sideck the titles described in them, and that they were valid grants. The deed of donation was introduced in the statement of facts, with the declaration that “ it is the donation under which the defendant claims one undivided half of all the lands included within the lines of said grant.” The court instructed the jury, that the plaintiff was entitled to the whole tract, unless her father had donated a part of it to Teal, &e.; and no instruction contrary to that was requested. The jury found “for the defendant one undivided half of the league in controversy.” Upon this verdict, judgment was rendered that Mrs. Teal recover one undivided half of the square league, and one-half of the long league, so far as it falls within the lines of the square league, no mention being made in the judgment of that part of the long league lying outside of the square league, or of plaintiff’s rights. By the same judgment or decree, commissioners were appointed to divide the land within the lines of the square league, assigning one-half to Mrs. Sevier and one-half to Mrs. Teal. The case was brought to this court and affirmed; and in February, 1872, the final decree of partition was rendered in the District Court. This decree confirmed the commissioners’ division of the land within the lines of the square league, and vested the title in the respective parties. "When the lines of the square league, and of this division of it, were run out, it was found that the house of Terrell (who claimed under the Sevier title, and who is one of the plaintiffs) was upon the land that fell to Mrs. Teal, and Mrs. Teal’s house was unexpectedly found to be on that part of the “ long league ” which, fell outside of the lines of the square league; and hence this suit, which was brought for that part of the “long league” which lies outside of the square league,.and is in the ordinary form of trespass to try title. The defendants pleaded not guilty, limitation of ten years, and the former judgment. On the trial, plaintiffs exhibited the grant for the long league to John B. Sideck, as a colonist of Power and Hewitson’s colony, of date 28th October, 1834. They showed that Frances Sevier was daughter and sole heir of the grantee, Sideck; and that he died before January 1, 1846. Deed from Mrs. Louisa Sevier.and husband, E. G. Sevier, made in 1851, to Barnes Simms and two others, for the two middle quarters of said grant, and evidence of transfer to plaintiff, O. L. Terrell, from the grantees in said deed other than Simms. Deed from Mrs. Louisa Sevier and husband, of date 1860, •for 650 acres of the lower one-quarter of said league, and transfers of same to plaintiff, C. L. Terrell. That Barnes Simms was dead, and heirship as alleged in the petition. Deed from E. G. Sevier, as administrator of his wife, Mrs. Louisa Sevier, for the upper quarter of said league, to A. B. Peticolas, reciting that said E. G. Sevier had contracted with one James Martin, an attorney at law, by which he was to have the upper-one-quarter of said league for certain professional services; that said services had been performed, in part, about the title to this land; and that said Peticolas held Martin’s contract. This , deed was also approved and confirmed by the Probate Court; and deed from Peticolas to plaintiff, C. L. Terrell. That Louisa Teal died prior to the year 1864, leaving the children named in the petition as heirs, four of whom are minors. That defendant, Anna Teal, was widow of Peter Teal; and that the other defendants are children of Peter and Anna Teal. The transcript of the record in Sevier v. Teal was then read, a synopsis of which is given above, in the general statement. Testimony was introduced, showing the location of the two grants; the long league and its conflict with the older grant; the petition made under the Sevier v. Teal decree; the situation with reference to the conflicting lines of the two grants and the partition lines, of the improvements or houses in which the respective claimants resided pending the litigation in the former suit, &c. The court instructed the jury: “That the legal effect of the judgment in the case of Sevier and Wife v. Teal, decided by the District Court of Goliad county, was to establish the title of Peter Teal’s heirs to the one-half of the square league, and to establish the title of the heirs of Louisa Sevier to the other half of the square league, and to all of the long league not included within the limits of the square league; and as the period of ten years has not elapsed after the date of that judgment, when this suit was instituted, the defendants can hold no part of the land in controversy under their plea of limitation, if you find, from the evidence, that the land sued for is that part of the long league not included within the lines of the square league.” The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiffs, for the land described in their petition, on which judgment was rendered. Motion for new trial having been overruled, the defendants, Teal et al., appealed.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1878-07-01

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Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently August 1978

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Moore, Associate Justice.

¶1Unquestionably, the land which is the subject-matter of this suit is a part of the tract for which E. G. Sevier and wife, from whom appellees deraign their title, brought the suit upon which the appellants rely to maintain their defense of res adjudicata. But an inspection of the record of that suit shows, beyond question, that the claim of Sevier and wife to the land for which appellees sue was not adjudicated against them.

¶2Although the defendants pleaded not guilty, yet, by their special pleas, they limited the issues to be adjudicated (Rivers v. Foote, 11 Tex., 662) to the right of Peter Teal to one-half of the land granted to John B. Sideck, September 18, 1830, *508and October 28,1834, by virtue of a donation executed to said Teal by said Sideck, December 15,1832. By her answer, the defendant expressly admits that Mrs. Sevier, the plaintiff in that suit, was entitled to one-half of the land. And it was ruled by this court, on the first appeal of the case, (Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex., 516,) that this donation relied upon by the defendant was inoperative, except as a gift of one-fifth of the property owned by the donor at its date. The court, as is manifest from its opinion, held that the defendant was not entitled to any part of the land involved in this suit, as it was not granted to Sideck until more than a year after the date of the donation to Teal. And it clearly appears, from the record, that the subsequent litigation in the case related exclusively to the land embraced in the grant of September 18, 1830.

¶3We see no good reason why a judgment might not have been rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the land sued for, not included within the limits of the league to which the defendants’ claim under the donation to Teal, can be regarded as referring, subsequent to the decision of this court to which we have referred. But if this land was not expressly adjudged to the plaintiffs, there can be no pretense that judgment was, or could have been, rendered for it in favor of the defendants on the pleading and verdict. While it is not controverted, that, as a general principle, the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction is not only final as to the matters actually determined thereby, but also upon all matters properly involved in the issue passed upon and determined by the court; and that all matters put in litigation in a previous suit, and which could have been adjudicated therein, are concluded by it. (Foster v. Wells, 4 Tex., 101; La Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Cas., 992.) But certainly it cannot be so held, where the record clearly shows that the matter in question was not in fact passed upon or adjudicated by the court; and this, too, when it could not, under the pleading and verdict, have been decided adversely to the *509party against whom the judgment is claimed to operate as res adjudicata.

¶4The objections to the deed from E. GL Sevier, as administrator of his deceased wife, Louisa Sevier, to Peticolas, should have been sustained. No authority was shown in the administrator to make this deed, or to bind the estate of his intestate to pay an attorney, for services rendered the estate, in lands. To concede to administrators such power, would virtually surrender to them the unrestricted management and disposal of the entire property of the estates they represent. The decree of the District Court gave to this deed no additional force. There was no case or parties before the court to authorize or warrant such a decree.

¶5The deed from Peticolas to Terrell was made subsequent to the institution of the suit, and, if objected to on this ground, should have been excluded, (24 Tex., 208,) even if the deed from Sevier to him had been unobjectionable.

¶6There is also, in my opinion, an error, not discussed by counsel or distinctly presented by the assignment of errors, but going to the foundation of the judgment, which would require its reversal, and to which, in remanding the case to the District Court, it is proper to call the attention of the parties. The plaintiffs, in their petition, claim to be joint owners of the land sued for; and they have, by the judgment, jointly recovered. But the evidence shows several titles for some of the tracts, making the aggregate described in the petition and judgment. The testimony relied upon by the plaintiffs does not, therefore, prove the title alleged in their petition, or support the judgment.

¶7The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

¶8Reversed and remanded.