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48 Tex. Crim. 289

88 S.W 212

Upton v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1905-05-24

<p>1. —Murder in Second Degree—Evidence—Sending Notes to Defendant’s Wife.</p> <p>Where in a prosecution for murder, there was evidence that defendant killed deceased on account of the latter’s familiarity with the farmer’s wife, and that she had received a note purporting to have been written by the deceased, which was disputed, however, by the prosecution, it was error to exclude testimony showing the friendly relations existing between the deceased and defendant’s children for the purpose of showing that deceased would likely procure defendant’s children in carrying notes between deceased and defendant’s wife; and this whether defendant knew at that time that deceased was sending such notes by said children to defendant’s wife or not.</p> <p>2. —Same—Recalling Witness—Discretion of Court—Practice.</p> <p>It is permissible to recall a witness, even after the defendant has closed his case, either in rebuttal, or where there is some controversy as to what the witness may have stated; and he can be required to restate his testimony on the point. This is a matter within the discretion of the court.</p> <p>3. —Same-Bill of Exceptions—Must State Purpose of Testimony.</p> <p>Where the object and purpose of the rejeetSd testimony is not stated in the bill of exceptions the matter can not be reviewed; and the court is not permitted to look to the statement of facts for the evidence in order to understand such object and purpose.</p> <p>4. —Same—Evidence—Surrender of Defendant.</p> <p>Where there is no controversy on the question as to the voluntary surrender of defendant, there was no error in excluding testimony as to the circumstances attending the defendant’s surrender.</p> <p>5. —Same—Evidence—Res Gestae—Declaration of Third Party.</p> <p>Where in a prosecution for murder, the wife of defendant had testified to the delivery to her of a note from the deceased, immediately preceding his killing by defendant, by one of her children, it was error to exclude testimony as to what the child said as to who sent the note, and that it was sent by deceased; and this, although the object and purpose of such testimony is not stated further than tjiat it was res gestae.</p> <p>6. —Same—Withdrawal of Jury—Discretion of Court—Practice.,</p> <p>Where the trial judge had the jury taken out of court to enable him to determine the issues to be submitted to the jury, he was exercising proper judicial discretion, although at the time counsel for defendant w'as arguing a question of law' to the court and objected to such withdrawal of the jury.</p> <p>7. —Same—Verdict—Misspelling of Word.</p> <p>A verdict in a felony case which uses the word “punish” instead of “punishment” is valid on motion for new trial.”</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently March 1944

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1905-05-24

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¶1This case was affirmed at a former day of this term and now comes before us on motion for rehearing. Appellant urgently insists that the court was in error in holding that he failed to state the purpose he had in view in showing the friendly relations existing between George Reed (deceased) and appellant's children; and further, that the court was mistaken in holding that it was not controverted matter about Reed sending notes by the children of appellant. A more critical examination of this bill suggests that appellant does state that his purpose in introducing this testimony was to show that deceased would likely procure appellant's children in carrying notes between himself and appellant's wife. True, the court states in qualification to said bill that the evidence does not show that at the time this conversation occurred between Upton and Reed, that Reed had ever sent a note by the children. On reflection it does not occur to us that this explanation disposes of appellant's bill of exceptions in this particular. In our view it would not matter whether appellant knew at that time anything in regard to the notes, or that deceased was sending notes by his children to his wife. Now, if as stated in the original opinion, there was no controversy in regard to deceased sending the notes by appellant's children to his (appellant's) wife, then the refusal of the court to permit the testimony, perhaps would not be injurious to appellant. However, we do find in the testimony that the genuineness of these notes was contested by the State. It was proven by the mother of deceased that the note produced in evidence did not have the genuine signature of her son, George Reed. So that in a sense there was a controversy as to the genuineness of these notes, which evidently embraced the fact as to whether or not they were sent by deceased to appellant's wife. Taking this view of the question, we were evidently in error in holding that the court was correct in excluding the testimony as is shown by the bill. We also believe that we were mistaken in holding that appellant's bill number 5 failed to show error. If the delivery of the note from deceased to appellant's wife by appellant's little child was admissible in evidence, and unquestionably it was, what occurred at that time, as stated in the original *295 opinion, was a part of the res gestæ of that act, and was admissible as a part of the act; and although the object and purpose is not further stated than that it was res gestæ, we believe that was a sufficient statement to render it admissible, in connection with the delivery of the note. If that was a material circumstance, it was obviously material to show what was said by the messenger at that time as to who sent it.

¶2The motion for rehearing is accordingly granted, and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

¶3Reversed and remanded.

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