Volume 48 — United States Reports

Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States established the political question doctrine in controversies arising under the Guarantee Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution (Art. IV, § 4).

Held: the primary purpose, for the most part, the detail of tfeghip’s service and duty was made subordinate to them, and thus moré of the officers and men were for the time withdrawn from the immediate duties of the ship than otherwise would have been ; that under these circumstances, while lying in the said port, the marines on board being employed, among other duties, in keeping guard over such men as were from time^to…

Held: and the representations of the vendor If these representations are false, the maker of them is, in such case, responsible.” And in Campbell v. Whittingham. 5 J. J. Marsh. 100 , the court said, — “ Had the nature of Campbell’s title to the lot purchased by Whittingham and Peters been fraudulently concealed, or had he made fraudulent representations on that subject, by which the purchasers were seduced into the…

Held: that under the old code,-where such consent was given, the adjudication was not void; but by the Code of Practice the Probate Court alone had power to try such cases, and consent of parties could not. confer the power on the District Court. Judgment therefore annulled. To like eifect is the case in 4 La. Rep. 539 , and 10 La. Rep. 219 , and many more could be cited. The case in 5 La.

Held: that '‘it is well settled in our jurisprudence, that, in forced alienations of property, there must bé a reasonable diligence in, and compliance-with, the forms of the law, under a penalty of nullity.

This case came up, on a certificate of division in opinion, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Illinois.

Held: that the charter of the Life and Trust Company conferred no authority upon it to lend' its credit, or issue the bonds for which the mortgage in question was given, and that the bond and mortgage taken therefor were inoperative and void. The charter of the company, together with several amendments of the same, were given in evidence. .

This was an appeal from the Circuit. Court of the United States for the District of Columbia and Coiinty of Alexandria, sitting as a court of chancery. The bill ws filed in fhe Circuit Court by. the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank -of Potomac, Elijah Dallett and Elijah Dallett-, Jr., trading under the firm of Elijah Dallett Co., William H. Miller, and A. C. Cazenove & Co., who sue in behalf of themselves and such other creditors of the estate of'Edward.

Held: that a mortgagee in possession for seventy years, under legal title, should not be redeemed or disturbed ; for so long an acquiescence should be taken as an implied waiver of the right to redeem, especially when the rents were insufficient- to keep down the interest for more than *243 fifty years. Stoiie v. Byrne, 2 Bro. P. C. 399; S. P., 3 Johns. Ch. 129 .

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama, by a writ of error, issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. In 1845, the Branch Bank of' Mobile obtained a judgment in the Circuit Court of Mobile county (State court) against Maria Matheson, John Darrington, ■ and Robert D. James, for the sum of ten thousand five hundred and seventy-three, dollars and eighty-two cents.

Held: .that Galloway could not, while standing in the relation of a purchaser, be permitted to avail- himself of the defect he relied on in his vendors’ title, to defeat his agreement to purchase. Whether he could do so was the main and only necessary question in that case. 2. The entry in-that case was made on patented lands. In this case, it was on lands not patented.

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of Vermont, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. The following statement of facts was argued upon by the counsel in the court where the cause was originally tried. Orange County Court, December Term, 1844. Jared Wells v. Timothy L. Mace and Trustees. Action of Assumpsit for money paid.

<p>The Commercial and Railroad Bank of Vicksburg assigned all its property to trustees, reciting that “ the embarrassed situation of the bank and the present inability of its debtors to meet their liabilities, and by consequence that the bank was unable to pay its debts promptly, rendered it proper that a general assignment should be made for the benefit of its creditors and completion of the railroad ” ; it therefore assigned all its property, real, personal,, and mixed, to trustees, with ’ authority to sell the effects assigned, to collect all debts due tó the institution, to complete the railroad, for which purpose they were authorized to borrow a sum not exceeding $ 250,000, to allow claims against -the bank of a certain description, and out of the proceeds collected first to pay the principal and interest of the above loan; after the'rompletioir of the said road, dividends were to be made pro rata amongst the creditors of the bank who had filed their claims, should there not be a sufficient amount to pay all the claims; the trustees to receive eight thousand dollars each per annum for their services.</p> <p>This deed was fraudulent and void as to all creditors of the bank who did not become parties to it by filing their claims.</p>

This was a writ of error sued out under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, and directed to the Supreme Court of. Alabama.

Smith v. Turner and Norris v. Boston, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849), were two similar cases, argued together before the United States Supreme Court, which decided 5–4 that it is unconstitutional for states to impose a tax based on the number of incoming immigrants on board or disembarking from a ship. The cases are also known as the Passenger Case or the Passenger Cases.

This cause was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi. The circumstances were these. By the treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, of the 27th Septem- ■ ber, 1830, the Choctaw nation ceded to the United States the entire country they owned and possessed east of the Mississippi ' River.

This case was bi ought up from the Supreme Court of the • S-tate of Alabama, by a writ of error, issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. The facts in the case áre sufficiently set forth in the opinion of .the court. ' 'The points made by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error were the following.

This case came up, on a certificate of division, from the Circuit Court- of the United States for the District of Maryland. The Reporter finds the following statement prefixed to the opinion of the court, as .delivered by Mr. Justice Nelson.

This case was brought up from the Superior Court of Judicature for the State of New Hampshire, by a writ of error, issued under the twehty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. Peck and Bellows were residents of the town of Walpole, in the county of Cheshire and State of New Hampshire. Jenness, Gage, and Company resided in Boston. The facts in the case are sufficiently set forth in the opinion. of the court.

This, like the preceding case of Peck v. Jenness, was brought up from the Superior Court of Judicature of the State of New Hampshire, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. Ledden was an inhabitant of the Province of New Brunswick, and Colby of the State of New Hampshire. The attaeh- • ment was issued in 1837. The. case was similar, in it¡3 principal- circumstances, to that of Peck v. Jenness, and was argued together with it.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky.

This case came up, on a certificate of division, from- the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. The following is the statement of facts agreed upon in the court belowby the counsel for the respective parties, and. sent up with the record. “ Wm. Sadlee and Fkancis Sadlee, 1 v. >In Chancery.

<p>Where a decree in chancery refers th§ matters to a.master to ascertain the amount of damages, and in the mean time the bill is not dismissed, nor is there a decree for costs, the decree is not a final one, from which an appeal will lie to this court, although there is a perpetual injunction granted.-</p> <p>The amount of damage which mil'follow from restraining a party from using a machine held under a patent right is a proper consideration-to be addresser! to the' Circuit Court, but does not cónstitute a ground of appéal.</p>

<p>The meaning of the forty-third rule of this court is,.that, if a judgment'or decree in -the court below be rendered more than thirty days before the commencement of the term ofthis court, and the record be not filed within the first six days of tie term, the appellee or defendant in error may docket the case, and move' for its dismissal as the rule prescribes. I</p> <p>But if the judgment or decree of the court below be rendered less than thirty days before .the commencement of the term of this court, the rule does not apply.</p>

State of Missouri v. State of Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 660 (1849), is a 9-to-0 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the Sullivan Line of 1816 was the accepted boundary between the states of Iowa and Missouri. The ruling resolved a long-standing border dispute between the two states, which had nearly erupted in military clashes during the so-called "Honey War" of 1839.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. It was a suit brought by the United States upon , a postmaster’s bond against Walter F. Jones (the postmaster at Norfolk) in Virginia), and Thomas Ap Catesby Jones and Duncan Robertson, his sureties. Judgment went by default against the ppstmaster and Robertson.

Held: that brieks of less dimensions could not be recovered for, though there was nothing in the act declaring the sale void. Law v. Hodgson, 2 Camp. 147. And in the case of Sprergean v. McElwain, 6 Ohio. 442 , it is decided, that where the statute forbids the keeping of a ninepin alley, under a penalty, a carpenter who builds one, knowing the object, cannot recover the price of building.

Held: in a state of, things much like this, as will soon be more fully explained, that it was bound to presume that “justice was administered in the ordinary form.”" 4 How. 167 . And hence, in 3 Stewart, (Alabama,) 447, 448, where a decree was averred in the record, but not its form, it was presumed to have been in the ordinary form.

This case came up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of the State of Mississippi, on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges thereof. The facts in the Mr. Nelson contended that neither of the exceptions was well taken. The first, because the allegation to which it refers was wholly immaterial, and not therefore required to be answered.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. It was a. libel filed in the District Court, as a court of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, by Rae, the owner of a vessel called the Zamora, against Cutler, in a cause of contribution or general average,- civil and maritime. The facts in the case- are set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the court, to which the reader is referred. .

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of Ohio, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. The facts were these: — By the fourth section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1803, to enable the State of Ohio to form a State constitution, (2 Statutes at Large, 226,) a township of land, to.be laid off in the Cincinnati land district, was granted to the State of Ohio for the purpose of establishing an academy.

Held: or interpreted as affecting, their said controversy ; in order to accomplish which it had then been determined and arranged, that the said' Matthew should assign and transfer to the said Duncan all the interest of the said Matthew of, in, and unto the said entries and warrants in such way as would enable the said Duncan to receive from the United States the moneys aforesaid, .out of which said money the said Duncan…

Held: gave a lien on^-fchc lands of the judgment debtor. 3 Salk. 212; 1 Wils. 39. “There is no statute in Virginia which, in express terms, makes a judgment a lien upon the lands of the, debtor.

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. The facts in the case áre sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court..

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of Indiana, by a writ of error isued .under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. . As a motion was madeto dismiss it for want.of jurisdiction, and , the merits , of the case were hot discussed; a brief statement of the facts will'be sufficient. .

This case came úp from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Illinois, on a certificáte of division in opinion between the judges thereof. It was an action of covenant under the following circumstances. . On the 12th of March,' 1819, Broadwell executed a deed with a general warranty, to William Lewis, by which he conveyed to him a tract of land in Ohio. In June, 1825, one Matthews recovered, by ejectment, one hundred acres of the land.

moved he court to direct the clerk to docket the case ás of the time when, the transcript of the record was received by him, and in support of his motion said, that this record was forwarded to the clerk early in'1848. That it was only recently he learned -that the clerk had declined filing or docketing it, until the bond prescribed by the thirty-seventh rule of court was given.

Held: that it is a proper fact for the jury to *797 decide, whether the importéd article is or is not known in commerce by the words or terms used in the tariff imposing the duty, and not a question of law, to be settled by. the court, as was' done here.

Backus v. Gould, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 798 (1849), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the Copyright Act of 1831 requires courts to award damages from copyright infringement based on the number of copies found in the accused's possession, not the number of infringing copies that they ever printed. At the time, at least in the case of books, a "copy" was defined as a complete reprinting or transcription of the work.

This case was formerly before this court, on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Michigan. ' Its facts and the reasons for its dismissal will be found in 6 Howard, 41.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States, sitting as a court of equity, for the District of Maine. The bill, filed by Steams as administrator de bonis non of John O. Page, proposed to open and review the accounts of the. estate of said Page, which were .filed from 1811 to 1816 by his widow and original administratrix, Sarah Page. The record was very voluminous.

Held: *854 that, where the Circuit Court decides, as in this case, both the fact and the law, no exception can regularly, be taken. Even in a court of common law, an exception is never taken to the judgment of the court upon á case stated, or on a special verdict ; yet the judgment is subject to revision in the appellate. court.