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480 F.2d 1185

Docket No. 72-1545.

Yellen v. Morton

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued June 1, 1973.

Decided June 18, 1973.

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1973-06-18

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently June 1973

1 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Applies 43 U.S.C. § 617E · 43 U.S.C. § 618K (Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act)

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1973-06-18

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¶1Anthony Z. Roisman, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

¶2Carl Strass, Atty., Dept, of Justice, of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, pro hac vice by special leave of Court, with whom Kent Frizzell, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Edmund B. Clark, Atty., Dept, of Justice, were on the brief, for appellees.

¶3Before DANAHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and McGOWAN and LEVEN-THAL, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM:

¶5Plaintiffs bring a class action as electric power customers of the Imperial Irrigation District. The District’s rates are not subject to state regulation in California. It generates part of its power from the hydroelectric potential of the All-American Canal, which was begun in 1932 as part of the Boulder Canyon Project. In 1968 there were 6,974 individuals or corporations using water for irrigation purposes and 30,132 residential users of electricity sold by the District.

¶6The District’s power supply is obtained in part by purchases of power from the Bureau of Reclamation at the Davis and Glen Canyon Dams. By memorandum dated November 27, 1963, Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, instructed the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation to insert in all contracts for the sale of power by the Bureau a provision reading:

The parties hereto agree and understand that the purpose of making low cost, federally generated power available is to encourage the most wide*1186spread use thereof, and the contractor therefore agrees:
a. That the benefit of federally generated power shall be made available at fair and reasonable terms to all of its customers at the lowest possible rates consistent with sound business principles.

¶7Plaintiffs complain that no regulations have been implemented to enforce this requirement.

¶8Plaintiffs pray that the court require the Secretary of the Interior to comply with the provisions of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, the Reclamation Laws and the Government’s power contracts with the District, and in consequence that the Secretary be directed “to immediately institute a rate'making proceeding for the purpose of establishing fair and reasonable electricity rate charges by the Imperial Irrigation District to the plaintiffs pursuant to those laws and contracts.”

¶9The District Court granted summary judgment dismissing the case, stating that neither the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, nor the contracts entered into between the United States and the District require the Secretary to regulate rates for the sale of electricity produced at power plants owned and operated by the District. The plaintiffs rely on section 6 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617e.*

¶10We need not consider whether or to what extent authority is given by the provision of section 6 that the Secretary shall prescribe and enforce regulations conforming with the requirements of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 respecting “control of rates and service in the absence of State regulation or interstate agreement.” The record does not contain any ruling or determination by the Secretary either defining or denying authority. The question is whether he has a duty to institute a rate-making proceeding. Even as to the sale of power at the Davis and Glen Canyon Dams, a separate project, where the Secretary plainly has some source of authority in contract, the Secretary had not taken any action. The District’s published reports, tendered by plaintiffs, indicate power earnings that are not “shocking,” as claimed in appellant’s brief, but rather indicate a ratio between net power operating revenues and total power assets, that is at most slightly over 7%. Plaintiffs did not make even a threshold showing of abuse of discretion or disregard of duty.

¶11Affirmed.

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