Rowland v. Tarr’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “What remains is Count III, a claim that the Act offends the equal protection clause because it discriminates unconstitutionally between males and females. This contention has not been adjudicated by the Supreme Court, although there is a thoughtful opinion by Chief Judge Marsh of the Western District of Pennsylvania concluding that such ‘classifications as age and sex are not arbitrary or unreasonable, and the classifications are justified by the compelling government interest... . ’ United States v. Dorris, 319 F.Supp. 1306, 1308 (W.D.Pa.1970). Guided by the stringent language of Ex parte Poresky, [ 290 U.S. 30 , 54 S.Ct. 3 , 78 L.Ed. 152 ], supra, which suggests that the ‘unsoundness’ of the claim must result ‘from previous decisions of this [Supreme] court,’ we are constrained to hold that this count presents an issue which is not yet foreclosed. From the district court’s opinion we are unable to determine oh what basis it rejected this particular count. Therefore, we will vacate the judgment of the district court and remand these proceedings solely for the purpose of considering Count III. If the district court is satisfied that plaintiffs have standing and that the constitutional attack is not insubstantial as defined in Goosby v. Osser, [ 409 U.S. 512 , 93 S.Ct. 854 , 35 L.Ed.2d 36 ] supra, it should request the convocation of a statutory court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 510 F. Supp. 292 - Goldberg v. Tarr