¶1(dissenting). I would deny the Judicial Tenure Commission’s motion for the Supreme Court to enter a default judgment against the garnishee defendant, California Charley’s Corporation. The respondent, Judge Trudel, is the apparent sole shareholder of that corporation, and there is no constitutional authority to assess costs against the *1214respondent. Therefore, there is no corresponding authority to enter a default judgment against the garnishee defendant. Thus, the commission’s motion should be denied.
¶2See my statement concurring in the September 22, 2006, order in this matter denying appointment of a receiver and relief from orders. 477 Mich 1202,1203 (2006). In that statement, I objected to the commission’s attempt to have the Supreme Court order the assessment and collection of costs against the respondent because there is no constitutional authority for the Supreme Court to assess costs against a judge as a respondent in a matter involving the Judicial Tenure Commission.
¶3Subsection 2 of Const 1963, art 6, § 30 establishes the Supreme Court’s limited authority to discipline and provides that “the supreme court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a judge . . . .” As I stated in my concurrence in In re Noecker, 472 Mich 1, 18-19 (2005), “[n]othing in this constitutional provision gives this Court any authority to discipline the judge by assessing the judge the costs of the Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings against him or her.”
¶4While under Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2) the Supreme Court also has the authority to “make rules implementing this section [concerning the Judicial Tenure Commission],”
¶5 While not pertinent to the matter now before us, the Supreme Court also has the authority to make rules “providing for confidentiality and privilege of proceedings.” Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2).
¶6(dissenting). I would deny the motion for entry of a default judgment because it appears that the interrogatories that serve as the basis for the default judgment were not served within the time permitted by MCR 3.101(L)(1).