United States v. Clay’s Empirical Analysis
481 F.2d 133 · 1973
Citation profile
27 federal appellate · 6 district · 10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 51 later decisions — most recently July 2015 · most notably United States v. Stricklin (1979), State v. Estencion (1981)
27 federal appellate · 6 district · 10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3731 · 18 U.S.C. § 841 (Amendments of 1973 to Federal Law)
Relies on Barker v. Wingo · United States v. Marion · Pollard v. United States · Strunk v. United States · Ruffalo v. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““[Federal] Rule [Crim.P.] 48(b) [similar to Rule 45] is a codification of the inherent power of a court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution.” [citing Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 48.01[1].] In order to maintain control of its calendar, a court has the power to require the parties to proceed with diligence and to meet deadlines established by court rule or order. 14”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Although the trial judge may have intended to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, such a result would have been unwarranted. The order of dismissal did not adjudicate the merits of the government’s charge. Nor did it rest on a finding that the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been denied. . It is, of course, well settled that a Rule 48 dismissal may rest on a non-constitutional ground, such as ‘want of prosecution’, and normally such a dismissal is without prejudice to a subsequent prosecution. We believe a dismissal for the purpose of ‘calendar control’ is in the same category. We therefore construe the district court’s order as a dismissal without prejudice.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In this case, if the district court’s ruling [on preindictment delay] were correct, re-indictment would not have been permissible. After the entry of the order of dismissal, it was obviously too late to shorten the preindictment delay that had already occurred. Moreover the issue of necessity had been determined adversely to the government. Therefore, even if the dismissal was technically without prejudice, as a practical matter, assuming the correctness of that order, there was no possibility of another indictment that would withstand an identical motion to dismiss.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.