Tyminski v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
481 F.2d 257 · 1973
Citation profile
46 federal appellate · 6 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 85 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2017 · most notably United States v. Kubrick (1979), Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States (2000)
46 federal appellate · 6 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Federal Tort Claims Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 2401
Relies on United States v. United States Gypsum Co. · Richards v. United States · Urie v. Thompson · Douglas v. Alabama · Babcock v. Jackson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“* * * [I]s premised on the notion that a person should not be required to investigate the cause of his injuries or to bring suit while receiving necessary treatment for the injuries. The interest in preventing stale claims convinces us that this rationale for the rule has no merit when a person knows of the acts constituting negligence. In this situation little, if any, investigation is necessary to determine whether a meritorious cause of action exists. * $ $”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues * * *.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Interestingly enough, the field of malpractice claims presents a striking illustration of the ill effects which would be produced were we to accept the Government’s theory. A majority of states adhere to the rule that a claim for malpractice accrues at the time of the wrongful act which constitutes the malpractice. In many of these states, however, exceptions have been engrafted upon this general rule. Thus, a number of states hold that, where the negligent physician continues to treat the injured patient after the initial negligent act, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date this treatment is terminated. Still other jurisdictions permit the injured patient to assert his claim for malpractice in the form of an action for breach of contract, or in the form of an action for fraud. A number of states, on the other hand, recognizing the injustice of the majority rule, have expressly rejected it in favor of a rule which permits the injured party to sue within a certain period after he has discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts upon which his claim is based. It is quite apparent, that application of these diverse rules under Section 2401(b) would produce diverse results as to the effect of that ■ section, and would thereby discriminate among claimants solely on the basis of where the operative facts giving rise to their claims arose. We cannot believe that this is what Congress intended. . . . Yet, if the Government”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.