Thomas v. Eby’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Federal courts have long recognized the potential for prisoners to evade the habeas exhaustion requirements by challenging the duration of their confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , rather than by filing habeas petitions. Consequently, the Supreme Court recognized a “habeas exception” to § 1983 in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 , 93 S.Ct. 1827 , 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), when it held that suits challenging the fact or duration of confinement fall within the traditional scope of habeas corpus and accordingly are not cognizable under § 1983. The Court expanded the habeas exception to § 1983 in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 , 117 S.Ct. 1584 , 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). In Heck, the Court determined that, unless a prisoner’s conviction or sentence were previously set aside by a separate legal or administrative action, § 1983 would not countenance claims for damages if a finding for the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate a conviction or sentence. And in Balisok, the Court concluded that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to challenge prison procedures employed to deprive him of good-time credits when the ... procedural defect alleged would, if established, “necessarily imply the invalid ity of the punishment imposed.” 520 U.S. at 648 , 117 S.Ct. at 1584 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lockett v. Suardini

2. “MDOC claims that Thomas’s loss of disciplinary credits necessarily lengthens his sentence, and that Thomas’s § 1983 claim therefore is barred under the ha-beas exception. However, the decision in Ryan v. Department of Corrections, 259 Mich.App. 26 , 672 N.W.2d 535 (Mich.Ct.App.2003), belies this argument. Ryan notes that disciplinary “credits are explicitly tied to a prisoner’s parole eligibility date and discharge date.... Thus, credits do not determine when a sentence expires or is completed, but only when a prisoner is subject to parole or discharge.” Id. at 541. This passage and the statute’s text demonstrate that, as in Dotson , success in Thomas’s § 1983 claim would not necessarily affect the duration of his sentence because prison officials would retain discretion regarding whether to grant him parole. Accordingly, the habeas exception does not bar Thomas’s § 1983 claim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 558 F. Supp. 2d 767 - Thompson-Bey v. Stapleton

3. “Under Sixth Circuit law, [a] retaliation claim essentially entails three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two-that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiffs protected conduct.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 647 F. Supp. 2d 826 - Carter v. Dolce