State v. Kummer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Entrapment occurs ‘when a law enforcement agent induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.’ NDCC 12.1-05-11(2). Any person cooperating with a law enforcement agency is a ‘law enforcement agent’ for purposes of the entrapment defense. NDCC 12.1-05-11(3); State v. Erban, 429 N.W.2d 408, 413 (N.D.1988). Entrapment is an affirmative defense that the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789, 796 (N.D.1989). Ordinarily, whether entrapment exists is a question of fact for the jury. State v. Rehling, 426 N.W.2d 6, 7 (N.D.1988). But, if no dispute exists over the facts or the inferences to be drawn from the facts, the court may determine the existence of entrapment as a matter of law. City of Mandan v. Willman, 439 N.W.2d 92, 93 (N.D.1989). Police use of unlawful means is entrapment. “Our entrapment statute employs the ‘objective’ test ‘ “to determine whether police conduct is sufficiently unsavory to justify an entrapment defense.” ’ State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D.1978).... Thus, in order to fashion an entrapment defense under NDCC 12.1-05-11, the accused must establish two elements: that law enforcement agents induced the commission of the crime and that the method of inducement was likely to cause normally law-abiding p”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Murchison · State v. J.D.W.

2. “The police tactic of furnishing contraband “lacks the element of necessity that has historically been the basis for rationalizing government involvement in the commission of undercover crimes.” Comment, Criminal Procedure: Entrapment Rationale Employed to Condemn Government’s Furnishing of Contraband, 59 Minn.L.Rev. 444, 457 (1974) [Emphasis in original; footnote omitted]. There are sound public policy reasons for adopting a per se rule of entrapment in cases where the police furnish the controlled substance for the crime: “It seems easy to understand and to explain to police agents, and it seems to give clear guidance about the limits of permissible conduct. Moreover, it seems to strike at a dangerous and unnecessary law enforcement technique. If an agent suspects that a target is dealing in contraband, the agent can attempt to make a decoy purchase from him. There will normally be no need to provide the target with contraband; a person who has been trafficking will have his own sources. Indeed, the fact that an agent found it expedient to provide contraband raises a suspicion that the target was not predisposed. ... [T]he rule against furnishing contraband, like the exclusionary rule in search cases, can be seen as a prophylactic rule intended to protect innocent persons from police action intended for the guilty. An agent who feels free to give drugs to targets creates a danger of corrupting the innocent that an agent who merely makes decoy purchases does not.” R. Park, Th”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rivera v. State

3. “Kummer also asserts that we should require exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the electronic surveillance based on State v. Sarmiento, 397 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1981), where the court held that Florida’s equivalent to the Fourth Amendment precludes the warrantless interception of a private conversation in the subject’s home. However, that section of the Florida Constitution has since been amended to require that it be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court has concluded that this amendment effectively overruled Sarmiento. See State v. Hume, 512 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla.1987). Before that, moreover, a lower Florida appellate court had refused to apply Sarmien-to to monitoring of a suspect’s conversation in his motel room. Padgett v. State, 404 So.2d 151, 152 (Fla.Ct.App.1981). Even if an occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room [Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 , 84 S.Ct. 889, 893 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) ], Kummer was an invited guest of the occupants in this case. Kummer has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy during the three to five minutes he spent in the hotel room as an invited guest. See, for example, People v. Rada, 141 Misc.2d 218 , 532 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (1988).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Loh