Humphrey v. Mabry’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““requires more than a mere hunch, but is satisfied by a likelihood of criminal activity less than probable cause, and falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. If an officer possesses a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts, he may conduct a Terry stop.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. United States v. Lyons · United States v. Marcus Chandler

2. “In reviewing claims for qualified immunity, we conduct a two step analysis. First, we consider whether taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury ... the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. If the answer is yes, we next ask whether the right was clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case. For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand what his is doing violates that right. The question of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law which must be determined by the Court. While the sequence of this two-step inquiry is often appropriate, it is no longer mandatory.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 740 F. Supp. 2d 923 - Cochran v. Folger

3. “... An officer may permissibly conduct an investigatory stop when he or she can point to "a particularized and objective basis” that "leads ... reasonably to [the conclusion] in light of [the officer’s] experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom [the officer] is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.” Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ,' 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1999). Reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop must be considered under the totality of the circumstances, considering “all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time.” Feathersf v. Aey], 319 F.3d [843] 849 [(6th Cir.2003)].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Willis v. Neal