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482 N.E.2d 499

Dunfee v. State

Indiana Court of Appeals

Decided September 10, 1985

Indiana Court of Appeals · decided 1985-09-10

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently June 1987

2 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(a) determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him; (b) informing him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment or information or to an offense included thereunder and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and sentence; (c) informing him that by his plea of guilty he waives his rights to a public and speedy trial by jury, to face the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself; (d) informing him of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the offense charged and of any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; (e) informing him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound thereby.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Saperito v. State

Relies on Sidell v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division · Anderson v. State · Martin v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-09-10

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

GARRARD, Judge.

¶1On August 17, 1982, pursuant to a plea agreement, Dunfee pleaded guilty to dealing in cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court denied Dunfee's subsequent petition for post conviction relief and Dunfee appeals. He asserts his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered because: (1) the trial court failed to advise him that it was not a party to, or bound by, his plea bargain, and (2) failed to advise him of the possibility of imposing consecutive sentences.

¶2Dunfee relies upon IC 85-4.1-1-8 [Repealed] as it existed in 1982 and the line of cases stemming from German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 284. We find his arguments to be totally specious.

¶3We agree with Dunfee that IC 35-4.1-1-8 applied when his plea was entered, and that it required a trial judge to inform a defendant that the court was not a party to, nor bound by, any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense. This provision was enacted to insure that under our prior practice, which did not formally recognize plea bargains, an accused was not coerced into accepting a plea agreement due to the judge's participation. See, eg., Anderson v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 583, 335 N.E.2d 225. Of nearly equal significance was the necessity that the defendant not be misled into believing the judge was automatically bound by an agreement he entered into with someone from the prosecutor's office.

¶4In the Acts of 1981 the legislature formally recognized the legitimacy of plea agreements, IC 85-85-8-1 et seq., and amended the advisement statute to require the court to advise a defendant that if there is a plea bargain of which the court is informed and the court accepts the plea, then the court is bound by the bargain. IC 85-385-1-2. These provisions went into effect two weeks after Dunfee entered his plea.

¶5Thus, the court should have advised Dunfee it was not bound by his plea agreement. Instead the court advised Dunfee that it was bound by the agreement, and then proceeded to comply with all the provisions thereof.

¶6This was error, but it was error that was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was absolutely no prejudice or injury to Dunfee occasioned thereby. See Martin v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 1001.

¶7Dunfee next correctly charges that the court did not advise him of the possibility of consecutive sentences. 1 did not need to. Dunfee was subject to a one count information and there was no indication of any other pending charges, parole, ete. See IC 85-50-1-2. Thus, there was *501no error since the possibility of consecutive sentences had no application to Dunfee's case. See Hennings v. State (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 1142; Pearson v. State (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 808.

¶8Affirmed.

STATON, P.J., and HOFFMAN, J., concur.

¶9. Indeed the court carefully and thoroughly advised Dunfee of his constitutional rights, the potential impact of Dunfee's prior convictions, etc.

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