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482 P.3d 1212

TAYLOR VS. COLON

Nevada Supreme Court

Decided December 31, 2020

Nevada Supreme Court · decided 2020-12-31

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently September 2024

2 state decisions

Relies on Silvar v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark · Silvar v. Dist. Ct.

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Decided 2020-12-31

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136 Nev., Advance Opinion 50 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA JAMES TAYLOR; NEVADA GAMING No. 78517 CONTROL BOARD; AND AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, Appellants, FILE vs. DR. NICHOLAS G. COLON, DEC 3 1 2020 Respondent. ELIZ CLERK BY tfic DEPUTY CLERK Appeal from a district court order denying an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Theresa M. Haar, Special Assistant Attorney General, Carson City, for Appellants James Taylor and Nevada Gaming Control Board. McDonald Carano LLP and Jeffrey A. Silvestri and Jason B. Sifers, Las Vegas, for Appellant American Gaming Association. Nersesian & Sankiewicz and Robert A. Nersesian and Thea M. Sankiewicz, Las Vegas, for Respondent. BEFORE GIBBONS, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ. AMENDED OPINION By the Court, STIGLICH, J.: We are asked to consider for the first time whether Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which include a procedural mechanism to summarily dismiss meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling speech, violate the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) I 947A constitutional right to a jury trial. We hold that they do not, and therefore determine that the district court did not err in concluding that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes are constitutional and proceeding to consider an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. However, we determine that the district court erred in denying appellants anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, because appellants demonstrated that appellant James Taylor's presentation at the Global Gaming Expo was a good-faith communication. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings on the motion. BACKGROUND On October 2, 2017, appellant James Taylor, as Deputy Chief of the Enforcement Division of appellant Nevada Gaming Control Board (GCB), gave a presentation entitled Scams, Cheats, and Blacklists to approximately 300 attendees at the Global Gaming Expo, an event organized by appellant American Gaming Association (AGA). The purpose of Taylor's presentation was to identify the types of scams, cheating, and cheating devices that GCB investigated. During a section of the presentation on the use of cheating devices, Taylor presented a nine-second video clip depicting an individual playing blackjack while holding a standard tally counter device under the table. The individual was only visible from the neck down, and Taylor did not mention the individual by name. Nonetheless, respondent Nicholas Colon, a well-known gambler who attended the presentation, claims that many attendees were able to identify the depicted individual as himself. Appellants do not dispute that Colon was depicted in the video clip. Taylor proceeded to identify the counting device and explain that it was the only device GCB recovered that year. Colon alleges that SUPREME COURT Oe NEVADA 2 (0) I947A 4,409. Taylor also stated that the person depicted in the video clip was arrested for his behavior and was a cheater and criminal, although appellants dispute Taylor saying such statements. Colon sued Taylor, GCB, and AGA for defamation. He claimed that the video clip was presented untruthfully as an alleged exemplar of cheating. Although Colon admitted that he possessed the counting device, he maintained that such device could not be used to cheat at blackjack. He therefore asserted that the video clip and Taylor's accompanying comments were defamatory. Appellants filed an anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) motion to dismiss, arguing that Taylor's presentation was a good-faith statement made in direct connection with a matter of public concern in a public forum, and that Colon could not demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim. In support of their motion, appellants attached Taylor's declaration. Taylor first attested that he acquired all of the information, videos, and photographs contained in his presentation through GCB investigations. Second, he stated that the information contained in his presentation was true and accurate. Third, he declared that he did not state that Colon was a cheater, but rather focused his presentation on the counting device recovered by GCB. Colon opposed the motion, arguing that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes violated his constitutional right to a jury trial and that appellants failed to show that Taylor's presentation was made in good faith. The district court denied appellants anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. Although it concluded that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate Colon's constitutional right to a jury trial, it found that Taylor's SUPREME COURT OF NMIADA 3 (0) 1947A presentation was not made in good faith. In doing so, the district court relied on declarations attached to Colon's opposition to appellants anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, which stated that the counting device could not be used to cheat at blackjack. The court also relied on the fact that Taylor did not dispute this contention in his own declaration. The district court therefore concluded that Taylor's presentation was neither truthful nor made without knowledge of its falsehood, and denied appellants' anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION In this appeal, we first evaluate whether Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes violate Colon's constitutional right to a jury trial. We then consider whether the district court erred in denying appellants' anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate Colon's constitutional right to a jury trial Nevada's constitution provides that "Mlle right of trial by Jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever." Nev. Const. art. 1, § 3. The constitution "guarantees the right to have factual issues determined by a jury." Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 792, 796, 358 P.3d 234, 238 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Colon argues that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes violate his constitutional right to a jury trial. We review the constitutionality of statutes de novo. Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d 682, 684 (2006). "Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden of showing that a statute is unconstitutional." Tam, 131 Nev. at 796, 358 P.3d at 237-38 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In order to meet that SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I947A that he acquired all of the information, videos, and photographs used in his presentation through GCB investigations, and that the information contained in his presentation was true and accurate. Taylor also stated that he was aware Colon had been arrested for cheating on that day and had later pleaded to a lesser offense as the result of negotiations. This declaration shows that the gist of Taylor's presentation—that the player in the video had been caught with a cheating device—was either truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood. See Delucchi v. Songer, 133 Nev. 290, 300, 396 P.3d 826, 833 (2017) (holding that a defendant demonstrated that his communication was true or made without knowledge of its falsehood when, in a declaration, he stated that the information contained in his communication was truthful to the best of his knowledge and he made no statements he knew to be false). Although "contradictory evidence in the record!' may undermine a defendant's sworn declaration establishing good faith, Stark, 136 Nev. at 43, 458 P.3d at 347, Colon failed to contradict Taylor's claim of good faith. Colon points to declarations that, if believed, would establish that the specific counting device he was caught with cannot be used to cheat at blackjack.3 But these declarations did not address the correct issue at prong one, which is whether Taylor believed Colon had been caught with a cheating device, and not whether he was correct. Accordingly, because appellants demonstrated that Taylor's presentation was truthful or made 3These declarations claim that, in order to be useful for card counting, a device must have the ability to both add low cards and subtract high cards. They further claim that a simple crowd counter such as the one depicted in Taylor's presentation can only add, not subtract. While the presentation used a stock photo, Colon stated in a declaration that the specific device he possessed was indeed a crowd counter. 12 without knowledge of its falsehood, the district court erred in denying appellants anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. CONCLUSION We hold that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate Colon's right to a jury trial, and therefore, the district court properly considered appellants' anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. Because appellants sufficiently demonstrated that Taylor's presentation was made in good faith, however, we hold that the district court erred in denying that motion under prong one of the two-part inquiry. We therefore reverse the district court's order and remand for the district court to proceed to prong two of the anti-SLAPP analysis and for any further proceedings thereafter. "444auh) , J Stiglich We concur: 7 J. 7 J. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 13 ( 0) I947A .4gg:ID
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