Commonwealth v. Colding’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““If a defendant is sentenced, but the judge chooses to suspend sentence pending a period of probation, the trial judge may re-sentence the defendant if he violates that probation. The maximum period of the re-sentence is limited, however, to the maximum term under which the defendant was originally sentenced. Our Supreme Court has held that a ‘modification of a sentence imposed on a criminal defendant which increases the punishment constitute^] further or double jeopardy.’ Commonwealth v. Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 215 , 275 A.2d 308 (1971); see also Commonwealth v. Davy, 218 Pa.Super. 355 , 280 A.2d 407 (1971). “The instant case does not involve a situation where appellant was re-sentenced after a suspended sentence. By exercising the statutory option of imposing a period of probation in lieu of sentencing, the court defers sentencing a defendant to a fixed term of imprisonment until such time as the defendant has violated the conditions of his probation. In other words, the setting of the term of probation is not a term of sentence, and may not act as a limitation on the court to impose a sentence for a term of years greater than the probationary period, not in excess of the maximum fixed by law for the particular offense. The sentence imposed by the court in the instant case — a period of imprisonment of not less than three years nor more than ten years — was within the court’s power as authorized by law. It was not a violation of the double jeopardy clause to sentence the ap”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 349 Pa. Super. 314 - Commonwealth v. Raynes

2. “We believe the Pearce rationale is applicable to the case at bar. Like the Pearce Court, we perceive no double jeopardy prohibition against imposition of a sentence which is more severe than that originally vacated [footnote omitted] when an intervening sentence of probation has been violated. This conclusion flows logically from the initial premise that a “vacated” sentence is of no legal effect. Moreover, any fear that a possibility of enhanced punishment will chill a defendant’s option to seek modification of a sentence pursuant to 12 P.S. § 1032, supra, n. 10, is offset by a requirement that any such enhancement be justified by the defendant’s conduct subsequent to the original sentencing. In summary, the case at bar presents a sentence validly vacated, see n. 2 supra, and replaced by a lesser sentence in the form of probation. It was only following a violation of probation by fresh criminal conduct that the court meted out a penalty arguably more severe than the original one. In these circumstances we see neither a double jeopardy problem nor the possibility that a defendant’s opportunity to seek modification of a sentence will be chilled by our holding. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, supra. Appellant’s contentions to the contrary must be rejected.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 292 Pa. Super. 310 - Commonwealth v. Fleeger

3. “If a trial court suspends sentence and places the defendant on probation, the court is not limited by a term of probation in sentencing the defendant who has violated a condition of probation. Commonwealth v. Cole, 222 Pa.Super. 229 , 294 A.2d 824 (1972). Cole , however, articulates a caveat to this power: “If a defendant is sentenced, but the judge chooses to suspend sentence pending a period of probation, the trial judge may re-sentence the defendant if he violates that probation. The maximum period of the re-sentence is limited, however, to the maximum term under which the defendant was originally sentenced.” 222 Pa.Super. at 231 , 294 A.2d at 825 (emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 292 Pa. Super. 310 - Commonwealth v. Fleeger