Placid Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission’s Empirical Analysis
483 F.2d 880 · 1973
Citation profile
76 federal appellate · 2 district · 12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 109 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2007 · most notably Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission (1974), Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Company. Federal Trade Commission v. The Superior Oil Company, Inc., a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Exxon Corporation, a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Shell Oil Company, a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Company of California, a Corporation. Federal Trade Commission v. Mobil Oil Corporation, a Corporation (1977)
76 federal appellate · 2 district · 12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 717C · 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Administrative Procedure Act of 1946)
Relies on Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation Same · Permian Basin Area Rate Cases · Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. · United Gas Pipe Line Company v. Mobile Gas Service Corporation · Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 109 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"If a proposal enjoys unanimous support from all of the immediate parties, it could certainly be adopted as a settlement agreement if approved in the general interest of the public. But even if there is a lack of unanimity, it may be adopted as a resolution on the merits, if . . . [the Commission] makes an independent finding supported by `substantial evidence on the record as a whole' that the proposal will establish `just and reasonable rates' for the area." Mobile Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, supra, 417 U.S. at 314 [ 94 S.Ct. at 2348 ], citing Placid Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, supra, 483 F.2d at 893 . (Emphasis in original.) [3]”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage“13 As might be expected, there is some controversy over this. Standing virtually alone against the National (and record) judgment of a near energy calamity, the American Public Gas Association (APGA) contends that the current critical shortage of natural gas is but a pretextual “cry of wolf” calculated to mislead FPC into establishing artificially high rates in the producers’ behalf. APGA would have us believe that the energy crisis is a mirage — indeed, a hoax! APGA claims that “there appear to be adequate supplies of gas in the domestic United States to satisfy the projected demands of U. S. consumers well into the 21st Century.” APGA Supp.Brf. at 5 n. 9. But to talk of “Supplies” of gas is a misleading oversimplification. Obviously, the gas is not presently available. At most, if there is appropriate exploration, the demonstrable reserves may be exploited to meet the needs. Given a system which depends on private stewardship and marshalling of natural resources, there is a supply shortage if the producers do not produce. FPC has the statutory duty, not only to guard the consumers against super-profits reaped from artificially inflated rates, but also to protect consumer interests by making sure that the rate schedule is high enough to elicit an adequate supply. It is a delicate balancing test. FPC must fix its course to attain the utopian “optimum” rate schedule. Given the current shortage of available supply FPC must swing the pendulum towards the incentive, supply-elicit”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Of course the royalty obligations of the producers are cost components of the rate structure. Any alteration of this component would necessarily alter the departure point of the rate calculations. And under the holding of the D. C. Circuit in Mobil, this would be an Erie determination of the contract stating the royalty percentage based upon the applicable principles of state law— totally beyond the control of the federal regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of regulating natural gas rates. “But we are not willing to alter or stay the implementation of area wide rates for the entire industry merely on the basis of what might happen to some producers’ costs if this statement of the law prevails. “If, as subsequent events develop, the producers are put in a bind by their royalty obligations, they may certainly petition FPC for individualized relief.” ( 483 F. 2d at 911 .)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.