Commonwealth v. Greene’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Now . . . that there is virtually a prescribed content to the colloquy which must precede acceptance of a jury trial waiver, I suggest that objections to the sufficiency or accuracy of the colloquy should initially be raised at the time of the colloquy and before the non-jury trial has been conducted. I am mindful of the fact that Pa.R. Crim.P. 1101 as interpreted by the Morin decision [supra] places upon the trial judge the obligation of seeing to it not only that the colloquy relative to jury waiver shall "appear on the record," but also that the colloquy which appears on the record shall be sufficient to support the court's finding that the waiver is knowing and intelligent. This, however, is no different than any other duty a judge has to perform which may bear on a litigant's constitutional rights; we expect a judge to apply the law as it has been written — this is the trial judge's burden, as it were. But to say as much is not to relieve the trial lawyer of his obligation to call any mistakes of the trial judge to his or her attention at the earliest practicable time. The language of Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 570 , 248 A.2d 301, 307 (1968) [failure to object to jury charge did not preclude appellate review because fundamental error involved], quoted with approval in Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 421 , 326 A.2d 272, 273 (1974), is equally applicable here: "The majority now — contrary to the whole course of modern ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 354 Pa. Super. 595 - Commonwealth v. Gumpert

2. “Although the colloquy here was substantially complete, the trial judge omitted any mention of one of the elements of a jury trial, that the jury’s verdict shall be unanimous. This omission violated the guidelines which this Court set up for jury trial waiver colloquies in Commonwealth v. Williams . At that time we expressly declined to denominate those guidelines [as] a per se rule. In Commonwealth v. Morin, however, the majority of the Court in effect established the Williams guidelines as inflexible requirements of the on-the-record colloquy, with the result that appellant’s counsel was held to have been ineffective in failing to object to defects in the colloquy in post-verdict motions or before the Superior Court. I dissented in Commonwealth v. Morin, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the lack of necessity, as I saw it, of molding the guidelines suggested in Williams, supra, into a per se rule where no widespread abuse of colloquy requirements had been shown. I continue to adhere to that view. Id., 483 Pa. at 197-98, 394 A.2d at 979. (footnote and citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 307 Pa. Super. 312 - Commonwealth v. Anthony

3. “The essential ingredients basic to the concept of a jury trial are the requirements that the jury be chosen from members of the community (the defendant’s peers), that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 310 Pa. Super. 74 - Commonwealth v. Quarles