Rosenbaum’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “At the time of the citation ... plaintiff Rosenbaum was using amplified sound in a mixed residential/commercial neighborhood after 9:00 p.m. He did not have a permit to use amplified sound. Officer Mark Lundin, a police officer on vehicle patrol, heard the sound from a block away with his windows closed, responded and asked Rosenbaum to turn the sound down. Approximately fifteen minutes later, Officer Lundin was dispatched on a noise complaint, at which time the complainant, Joe Narvid, signed a citizen’s arrest card. Narvid reported that Rosenbaum was keeping his children awake and had refused to turn the sound down when Narvid requested that he do so ... Based on what was reported to him, [the officer] had probable cause to believe Rosenbaum continued to use amplifiers, at a late hour and without the requisite permit, for purposes of vexing and annoying Narvid and not for the purpose of communication. At approximately 9:30 p.m. ... at Broadway and Columbus Avenue, [plaintiff] Livingston was preaching using amplification and had no permit for such amplification. Officer Milan Kangrga, on patrol in the North Beach area, responded to a noise complaint and requested that Livingston turn down his sound, which he did. Officer Kangrga returned, again in response to a noise complaint, at which time the volume was loud, and the complainant, Harry Wamack, who, by his address as indicated in the police report, resides near that intersection, signed a citizen’s arrest card. There is no”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 899 F. Supp. 2d 922 - Hampsmire v. City of Santa Cruz

2. “a. There, the noise ordinance had been enforced against numerous citizens in the past, both religious and nonreligious. Here, neither the Delivery Rule nor the Stocking Rule has ever been enforced against any pharmacy except Stormans’. b. There, there had been complaints under the noise ordinance based on a wide variety of religious and nonreligious speech. Here, there has never been a complaint under the Stocking Rule except with respect to Plan B. c. There, plaintiffs identified “only two incidents” where citizen complaints may have been based on disagreement with the plaintiffs’ religious message. Id. at 1158 . Here, Plaintiffs’ pharmacy faced a boycott, picketing, and an organized campaign that filed dozens of complaints based on opposition to Plaintiffs’ conscientious objections to Plan B. d. There, plaintiffs were allowed to continue to engage in their religious conduct as long as they lowered the volume of their preaching. Id. at 1159 . Here, Plaintiffs’ refusal to stock Plan B is completely prohibited. e. There, plaintiffs offered no evidence that the officials responding to the complaints “knew about, agreed with or adopted any views of the complainants.” Id. at 1159 . Here, at least one Board member is on record as stating that he disagrees with conscientious objections to Plan B, and that he intends to prosecute conscientious objectors to Plan B to the full extent of the law. f. There, the ordinance included guidelines that limited the government’s discretion in is”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky

3. “As for permit issuance, the district court correctly held that a proper control group would have been smaller groups that applied for permits for sound amplification at similar times and locations. By contrast, appellants' undifferentiated control group of permitted and non-permitted groups, large and small, using amplified sound was not comparable because these groups were not similarly situated because of their varying characteristics. Because appellants did not identify a bona fide control group, they cannot demonstrate a discriminatory effect in the City's issuance of permits for amplified sound.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 372 F. Supp. 3d 893 - Spears v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents