x999-1" type="majority">HATHAWAY, J.

At issue before this Court is the proper interpretation of the statutory provision requiring a notice of intent to sue (NOI) in medical malpractice actions.1 This case raises the issue whether a professional corporation (EC) must be provided an NOI before the commencement of the medical malpractice action. It also raises the issue of what statements must be set forth in an NOI to satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4) when a claim being made against the EC is based solely on a EC’s vicarious liability for its physician.

We hold, on the basis of the plain language of the relevant statutes, that when claims alleged against a EC are predicated on its vicarious liability for a licensed health care provider rendering professional services, an NOI must be provided. The NOI provision, MCL 600.2912b, clearly states that a plaintiff must provide all health professionals and health facilities an NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action. MCL 600.5838a delineates those health care providers and facilities against which claims of medical malpractice may be asserted.2 Claims asserted against providers and facilities not delineated in § 5838a sound in ordinary *403negligence.3 Because § 5838a specifically refers to PCs in its definitional section, a claim against a PC sounds in malpractice, but only when the claim asserted against the PC is for rendering professional services as defined in MCL 450.225. Under these circumstances, a PC must be provided an NOI.4 The claim against Huron Valley Radiology, PC., is one based on vicarious liability for the professional services of its licensed health care provider-employee; hence, plaintiff Brian Potter was required to provide a timely NOI as the action is one sounding in medical malpractice.

Moreover, we hold that the NOI filed in this case was fully compliant with the plain language of § 2912b(4), which governs its contents. First, there is no requirement in § 2912b(4) to set forth the legal relationships between named parties; rather, the plain language of § 2912b(4)(f) only requires naming each party to be sued. Secondly, where the only claim asserted against a PC is one for vicarious liability, and hence no other standard of care is being asserted against the PC, there is no requirement within § 2912b that mandates that a claimant set forth the legal doctrine of vicarious liability in the NOI.

The claim at issue in this case was one for vicarious liability only. In light of MCL 450.225, a PC can only render professional services through its licensed health care provider. Where the NOI names both the PC and the provider, the NOI is fully compliant as long as it sets forth all the factual and medical information necessary *404to inform the PC of the nature of the claim being asserted against the physician-provider. Because this NOI met these requirements, it was fully compliant and there is no need to dismiss this action on the basis of the NOI. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a medical malpractice action involving an alleged misreading of an MRI by defendant Kristyn H. Murry, M.D., on June 7, 2001. This misreading allegedly caused a delay in a needed emergency surgical procedure on plaintiffs spine. This delay resulted in permanent nerve damage to plaintiffs spine that impairs his ability to function, including causing difficulty with such things as walking and urinating. At the time of the alleged malpractice, Murry was employed by Huron Valley Radiology.

The procedural history of this case is complicated and lengthy. This case has been pending in our appellate system for over four years as the courts have conducted an exhaustive review of the content of Potter’s affidavit of merit and his NOI. The Court of Appeals has issued two opinions, and we are reviewing this case for the second time.5 The most recent Court of Appeals opinion summarized this long journey through our appellate system and the reasoning behind the rulings:

In these consolidated appeals, defendants appealed by leave granted orders in this medical malpractice action denying their motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Previously, a majority of this Court *405reversed, holding that plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because the attached affidavits of merit did not conform to the requirements of MCL 600.2912d. Potter v McLeary, 274 Mich App 222; 732 NW2d 600 (2007). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the portion of this Court’s judgment “dismissing the complaint with prejudice, because the dismissal should have been without prejudice ....” See 480 Mich 915 (2007) (emphasis in original). Our Supreme Court remanded to this Court for consideration of the remaining issues not addressed previously. We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

As noted in our previous opinion, the alleged malpractice took place on June 7, 2001. The period of limitations in medical malpractice cases is two years from the date the claim accrued. MCL 600.5805(6). Presuming the notice of intent was sufficient, the running of the period of limitations would have been tolled for 182 days from the date of the notice. MCL 600.2912b(l). A notice of intent was sent to defendants Huron Valley Radiology, EC., and Kristyn H. Murry, M.D., on May 30, 2003, leaving eight days remaining before the period of limitations expired. A notice of intent was sent to defendants St. Joseph Mercy Hospital Ann Arbor, Robert Domeier, D.O., and Emergency Physicians Medical Group, EC., on May 13, 2003, leaving 25 days before the period of limitations expired. The notices tolled the running of the limitations periods, which recommenced on November 30, 2003, and on November 13, 2003, respectively. The limitations period expired on December 8, 2003, for all defendants. Plaintiffs complaint was filed on November 4, 2003.

There was no serious dispute in our prior decision that the affidavits of merit were fatally defective because they failed to state how the physicians’ alleged failures related to plaintiffs alleged injuries, so they did not contain the required statement of proximate cause. See MCL 600.2912d. No conforming affidavits of merit were filed by December 8, 2003. A majority of this Court previously determined that plaintiff had therefore not filed an affidavit of merit at all, pursuant to Geralds v Munson Health*406care, 259 Mich App 225, 240; 673 NW2d 792 (2003), and Mouradian v Goldberg, 256 Mich App 566, 574; 664 NW2d 805 (2003), so plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. This Court therefore deemed it unnecessary to address defendants’ challenges to plaintiffs notices of intent.

After this Court’s previous decision, our Supreme Court overruled Geraldsand Mouradianas having misapplied the case of Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547, 553; 607 NW2d 711 (2000). Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581, 583-584; 734 NW2d 201 (2007). Our Supreme Court explained that Scarsellahad only held that “a medical-malpractice complaint filed without an affidavit of merit” was ineffective and would not toll the running of the applicable limitations period. Id. at 584 (emphasis in original). It further explained that Geraldsand Mouradianhad wrongly extended that holding to medical-malpractice complaints that were actually filed with affidavits of merit, but where those affidavits of merit failed to conform to the requirements of MCL 600.2912d. Kirkaldy, supra at 584-585. Our Supreme Court concluded that an affidavit of merit is presumptively valid — and therefore tolls the running of a limitations period when filed with a complaint — until successfully challenged in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 585-586. “Thus, if the defendant believes that an affidavit is deficient, the defendant must challenge the affidavit,” and the proper remedy for a successful challenge is dismissal without prejudice, affording the plaintiff “whatever time remains in the period of limitations” to file a complaint with a conforming affidavit. Id. at 586.

Our Supreme Court’s partial reversal in this case was based on its decision in Kirkaldy. As applied to the case at bar, plaintiffs complaint, filed with the affidavits of merit, tolled the running of the limitations period. Because we conclude that those affidavits of merit did not conform to the requirements of MCL 600.2912b, the proper remedy is for the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff may then file a new complaint with conforming affidavits of merit within the time remaining in the limitations period.

*407Because we declined to do so previously, we must address defendants Murry’s and Huron Valley Radiology’s challenges to the sufficiency of the notices of intent sent to them. Murry and Huron Valley Radiology first argue that the notice does not properly state the applicable standard of practice or care as required by MCL 600.2912b(4)(b). We agree, in part. The second paragraph of plaintiffs notice sets forth the following standard of care:

“The standard of care required Drs. Murry and/or [Gary] Augustyn and/or [Richard C.] McLeary to correctly read, interpret and report the correct results to the emergency room under the circumstances. Notwithstanding that standard of care, Drs. Murry and/or Augustyn and/or McLeary failed to properly interpret the MRI images and convey accurate information to the emergency room physician in charge of the patient that night.”

The standard of care completely fails to make any reference to defendant Huron Valley Radiology. Our Supreme Court has explained that plaintiff is not obligated to provide a completely correct standard of care, but “plaintiff was required to make a good-faith averment of some particularized standard for each of the professionals and facilities named in the notices.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679, 694; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (emphasis in original). The standard alleged here is more than the tautology rejected in Roberts, and we find it adequate with regard to defendant Murry. Plaintiff articulated a specific standard that Murry must correctly read, interpret, and report the results of the MRI test. This is specific to the requirements of the service that plaintiff received from Murry. It was sufficient to put defendant Murry on notice of the nature of the claim, which was failure to properly identify and report plaintiff’s injury. Therefore, it met the requirements of MCL 600.2912b(4)(b) with regard to Murry. However, the notice cannot satisfy all the statutory requirements with regard to defendant Huron Valley Radiology.

*408Because no other challenges to the notices of intent are raised, we will not consider them further. Therefore, the trial court properly denied summary disposition on the basis of the notices of intent to all defendants other than Huron Valley Radiology. With regard to Huron Valley Radiology, we believe that our Supreme Court’s treatment of deficient — but actually filed — affidavits of merit should, by analogy, be applied to deficient — but again actually filed — notices of intent, as well. See Kirkaldy, supra at 586. Notices of intent are presumed to be valid and proper, so they support the filing of a complaint after the notice period has run, unless and until the notice is successfully challenged. The remedy to be applied if a notice is successfully challenged is dismissal without prejudice, affording the plaintiff the opportunity to cure the deficiency within the time remaining within the limitations period as theretofore tolled by the now-invalidated notice or the subsequent filing of the complaint.

We hold as follows: summary disposition is granted without prejudice to Huron Valley Radiology on the basis of the notice of intent, summary disposition is denied to all other defendants on the basis of the notices of intent, and summary disposition is granted without prejudice to all defendants on the basis of the affidavits of merit. The applicable limitations periods remain tolled until entry of the grants of summary disposition. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[6]

On March 20, 2008, plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal asking this Court to grant leave to consider whether his NOI complied with the content requirements of § 2912b. On October 1, 2008, this Court granted leave; however, the issue was limited to the threshold question of whether it was necessary to provide an NOI to a PC. That order provided:

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 20, 2008, judgment of the Court of Appeals is *409considered and, it is granted, limited to the issue whether defendant Huron Valley Radiology, EC., is a “health facility or agency” to which a plaintiff is required to provide notice under MCL 600.2912b(l). See MCL 333.20106(1).[7]

Despite the limited grant order, the parties addressed the content of the NOI and whether it was defective in their briefing and in oral argument while advancing their respective positions.8 After oral argument, the Court expanded the grant order by asking the parties to file supplemental briefs on the additional issue of the tolling of the statute of limitations:

Oral argument having been heard on March 4,2009, the parties are directed to submit supplemental briefs addressing the issue whether, if a defendant professional corporation is not an entity to whom notice is required to be provided under MCL 600.2912b, the applicable statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(6), was nonetheless subject to statutory tolling provided in former MCL 600.5856(d).[9]

As we have resolved the threshold issue by holding that Potter must provide an NOI to Huron Valley Radiology, we must also resolve the underlying issue of whether this NOI is defective in order to conclude the analysis in this case. We take particular note of the fact that it has *410been over eight years since the malpractice occurred and nearly six years since the subject NOI was mailed to defendants. Further, it has been over 5x/2 years since the complaint was filed, with the last four years having been devoted to the appeal of issues relating to the affidavit of merit and the NOI. The parties are still waiting to have a court address the merits of the case. Given that we have had briefing and argument on all necessary issues, we can decide in this opinion both whether the plaintiff must provide a PC an NOI before commencing an action as well as whether the subject NOI was compliant with § 2912b.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues presented are issues of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.10 This Court also reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition.11

III. ANALYSIS

Interpretation of the NOI provision presents questions of statutory construction. Assuming that the Legislature has acted within its constitutional authority, the purpose of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.12 In determining the intent of the Legislature, this Court must first look to the language of the statute.13 The Court must, first and foremost, interpret the language *411of a statute in a manner that is consistent with the intent of the Legislature.14 “ ‘As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute. The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended.’ ”15 Moreover, when considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole.16 Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme.17 In defining particular words in statutes, we must consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.18 A statute must be read in conjunction with other relevant statutes to ensure that the legislative intent is correctly ascertained.19 Finally, the statute must be interpreted in a manner that ensures that it works in harmony with the entire statutory scheme.20

A. THE NATURE OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

Before we address whether a plaintiff must provide an NOI to a PC, it is necessary to review the legal structure of a PC and understand the nature of the services it provides. Since a professional corporation is a statutory creature, we look to the Professional Service *412Corporation Act, MCL 450.221 et seq., for guidance. The relevant provision of that act provides, in pertinent part:

A corporation organized and incorporated under this act shall not render professional services within this state except through its officers, employees, and agents who are duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the professional services within this state. The term employee does not include secretaries, bookkeepers, technicians, and other assistants who are not usually and ordinarily considered by custom and practice to be rendering professional services to the public for which a license or other legal authorization is required. [MCL 450.225 (emphasis added).]

This provision makes clear that a PC, while a separate legal entity, does not render professional services on its own; rather, it can only render professional services through its employees or agents who are licensed or legally authorized to render the professional services. This language stands as a legislative recognition that when a PC renders professional services, it is inexorably linked to the licensed health care provider. For all practical purposes, the PC and the health care provider are treated as the same entity when professional services are involved.21 Moreover, a PC can perform other types of services or take other actions through unlicensed employees or agents, but such actions would not constitute professional services under the act. This delineation of types of services is emphasized not only in the first sentence, it is reasserted in the second sentence of MCL 450.225, which states that “[t]he term employee does not include secretaries, bookkeepers, technicians, and other assistants who are not usually and ordinarily considered by custom and *413practice to be rendering professional services to the public for which a license or other legal authorization is required.” Thus, a PC can engage in two different types of actions: those that are professional services and those that are not. While the PC is vicariously hable for either of these types of actions pursuant to MCL 450.226,22 this distinction is pertinent in determining whether the medical malpractice statutes apply to a particular cause of action.

B. PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NOI REQUIREMENT

We now examine whether a plaintiff is required to provide an NOI to a PC before commencing a medical malpractice action. We start our analysis by examining the language of the NOI provision itself. Section 2912b states in relevant part:

*414(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced. [Emphasis added.]

The first sentence in this section provides critical guidance. The statute expressly limits the requirement of an NOI to an action alleging medical malpractice: “[A] person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice. . . .” Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the action sounds in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence. Only those actions sounding in medical malpractice are governed by the mandates of this statute.

This Court recently reiterated the method by which claims of medical malpractice and ordinary negligence are distinguished. In Kuznar, this Court was asked to determine whether a claim against a pharmacy for the actions of its non-licensed technicians sounded in medical malpractice or in ordinary negligence. In holding that the claims sounded in ordinary negligence, Kuznar reiterated the longstanding rule that claims sound in medical malpractice only when a two-pronged test is met. First, the claim must occur in the course of a professional relationship and, second, the claim must pose questions of medical judgment outside the realm of common knowledge and experience. If either prong is not met, the action sounds in ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice.23 With regard to the first prong, Kuznar stated:

*415A professional relationship exists if a person or an entity capable of committing medical malpractice was subject to a contractual duty to render professional health-care services to the plaintiff. Under the common law, only physicians and surgeons were potentially liable for medical malpractice. But in MCL 600.5838a(l), the Legislature expanded the scope of those who could be liable for medical malpractice. It provided for medical malpractice claims to be brought against “a person or entity who is or who holds himself or herself out to be a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or an employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency ....”

The primary issue in this case is whether the pharmacy technician and the pharmacy are covered by MCL 600.5838a(l).[24]

Kuznar correctly opined that only those health care providers and facilities designated within § 5838a could be sued for malpractice. Therefore, only those providers and facilities covered by § 5838a can meet the professional relationship prong of the test. Accordingly, Kuznar reviewed the language of § 5838a(l) to determine if a pharmacy was a designated entity. Section 5838a(l)(a) defines a “licensed health facility or agency” as “a health facility or agency licensed under article 17 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.20101 to 333.22260 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.”

Because § 5838a(l)(a) limits its application to only those health facilities and agencies licensed under article 17 of the Public Health Code, Kuznar next turned its attention to MCL 333.20106(1) to determine whether a pharmacy was within the list of designated entities. MCL 333.20106(1) provides that “health facility or agency” means:

*416(a) An ambulance operation, aircraft transport operation, nontransport prehospital life support operation, or medical first response service.

(b) A clinical laboratory.

(c) A county medical care facility.

(d) A freestanding surgical outpatient facility.

(e) A health maintenance organization.

(f) A home for the aged.

(g) A hospital.

(h) A nursing home.

(i) A hospice.

(j) A hospice residence.

(k) A facility or agency listed in subdivisions (a) to (h) located in a university, college, or other educational institution.

Kuznar concluded that because pharmacies were not included within this list, the claims asserted against them did not sound in medical malpractice.25 Rather, the claims asserted against the pharmacy sounded in ordinary negligence, and, accordingly, the medical malpractice statutes simply did not apply. It is this same statutory provision and analysis that has led to the question we now address. Because this same list of health facilities contained in § 333.20106(1) does not include PCs, the question arises whether PCs are exempt from any of the requirements of the medical malpractice statutory scheme. We conclude that it is *417unnecessary to refer to the list in § 333.20106(1) in this instance because the plain language of § 600.5838a, as amended effective April 1, 1994, expressly includes professional corporations within its definitional section.

Section 5838a(l), as amended, provides in pertinent part:

For purposes of this act, a claim based on the medical malpractice of a person or entity who is or who holds himself or herself out to be a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or an employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency who is engaging in or otherwise assisting in medical care and treatment, whether or not the licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or their employee or agent is engaged in the practice of the health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity, accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim. As used in this subsection:

(a) “Licensed health facility or agency” means a health facility or agency licensed under article 17 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.20101 to 333.22260 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

(b) “Licensed health care professional” means an individual licensed or registered under article 15 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections. 333.16101 to 333.18838 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, and engaged in the practice of his or her health profession in a sole proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation, or other business entity. However, licensed health care professional does not include a sanitarian or a veterinarian. [Emphasis added.]

This amendment of § 5838a was enacted as part of the same package of bills that created the NOI provision *418in April 1994.26 The amended § 5838a refers to professional corporations twice. Before this amendment, § 5838a made no reference whatsoever to professional corporations.27 This specific addition of professional corporations to § 5838a was a clear statement by the Legislature that it intended a PC to be an entity against which a medical malpractice action could be asserted. Further, the placement of the reference to professional corporations within § 5838a(l)(b) (defining heath care professionals), rather than within § 5838a(l)(a) (defining health facilities), stands as a recognition of the nature of services as delineated in the Professional Service Corporation Act, MCL 450.225. When a PC renders professional services, it is rendering those professional services through the licensed health care pro-vider and the two are treated as though they are one entity.

*419Finally, § 5838a recognizes that some services provided by a PC are professional services while others are not. Where the services provided are professional services rendered by a licensed health care provider, any claim challenging those services as being negligent sound in medical malpractice, and the statutes governing medical malpractice apply. Where the services provided by a PC are not professional services as defined in MCL 450.225, the claim would not be subject to the medical malpractice requirements because those claims sound in ordinary negligence. To hold otherwise would negate the intent of the Legislature and ignore the proper rules of statutory construction, which require that any one statute be read in conjunction with other relevant statutes to ensure that legislative intent is being correctly ascertained.

Accordingly, in the instant case, the first prong of the Kuznar test is met because a PC is a covered entity under § 5838a and the services provided were professional services. The second prong of the Kuznar test is also met because there is no dispute that the claims asserted posed questions of medical judgment outside the realm of common knowledge and experience. Consequently, because both prongs of the Kuznar test have been met, we conclude that this is a claim that sounds in medical malpractice. Because §2912b(l) clearly requires a claimant to provide a timely NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action, plaintiff was required to provide this PC with a timely NOI.

C. THE CONTENT REQUIREMENTS OF MCL 600.2912b

Because plaintiff did provide an NOI to Huron Valley Radiology, the next issue is whether the NOI was *420defective. The resolution of this issue requires an examination of the content requirements of § 2912b. The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant NOI contained a defect, thereby necessitating dismissal of the action without prejudice. The purported defect in the NOI can be summarized as the failure of plaintiff to set forth a statement in the NOI that Dr. Murry was the employee of Huron Valley Radiology and that this PC was vicariously liable for the actions of its employee-doctor. We take note of the fact that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the NOI was fully compliant with the content requirements under § 2912b(4) in all respects regarding Dr. Murry, a holding with which we fully agree. Also, we note that the only claim pursued against Huron Valley Radiology was one for vicarious liability for the actions of Dr. Murry, and the NOI fully informed Huron Valley Radiology and Dr. Murry of the claim being asserted against Dr. Murry. Thus, we are compelled to review § 2912b to determine if there is a statutory mandate to specifically set forth the legal relationship between these two parties in the NOI, and whether there is a statutory mandate to set forth that the claim asserted is one for vicarious liability when no other claims are being asserted. Our inquiry once again necessarily begins with an examination of the language of § 2912b.

The first question we examine is whether § 2912b requires that legal and employment relationships between the parties be set forth in an NOI. We hold that the answer is no. The content requirements for an NOI are set forth in subsection 2912b(4):

The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:

(a) The factual basis for the claim.

*421(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.

(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.

(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care.

(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.

(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim.

We find no language in this subsection that requires a claimant to set forth the nature of the relationship between the parties to be sued. To the contrary, subsection f clearly states that all that need be done in this regard is to identify the names of the health professional and facility being notified. We cannot add a requirement that is not contained in the statute’s plain language. Moreover, we cannot assume that defendants were unable to comprehend the nature of the relationship between them without having a claimant advise them in writing that such a relationship exists. Certainly they are fully aware of the legal relationship between them.28 More importantly, however, there simply is no requirement in the statute that a claimant *422advise the defendants of their legal or employment relationship.29 Accordingly, Potter’s NOI was not defective in this regard.

Our next query is whether § 2912b(4) contains a requirement that the claimant specifically set forth the legal theory of vicarious liability within the NOI, when vicarious liability is the only claim asserted. We again hold that the answer is an unequivocal no. There is nothing in the language of § 2912b(4) that states that a claimant must set forth the legal theory of vicarious liability. Nor can we add such a requirement to the statute. The statute is focused on a requirement that the claimants advise the recipient of the factual and medical basis of the claim being asserted.30 If no other claim is asserted against the PC, then there is no *423possibility for confusion regarding the nature of the claim being asserted against it. If the claimant wishes to make some other claim against the PC, then the claimant would be required to set forth that additional claim in order to satisfy the § 2912b(4)(b) “applicable standard of care” requirement. But if the only claim asserted against the PC is one for vicarious liability, the “applicable standard of care” requirement is met because there is only one standard of care: the standard of care for the provider. There is no separate standard of care for the PC. This analysis not only holds true to the statutory language, but also fully recognizes that the agent and principal share a singular identity for purposes of performing professional services, pursuant to the statute governing professional corporations.31 Accordingly, where the NOI adequately sets forth the claim against the agent or employee, the claimant need not repeat the same information, or state the words “vicarious liability” in the NOI, because the statute does not require the claimant to do so.

Moreover, we find Huron Valley Radiology’s assertions especially troubling because it openly admits knowing and understanding that it is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, Dr. Murry. In other words, while admitting that it employs Dr. Murry, Huron Valley Radiology simultaneously asks that we dismiss plaintiffs case for plaintiffs failure to tell it that it employs Dr. Murry. We query what purpose such a statement would serve. Huron Valley Radiology’s proposition exalts form over substance in an intolerable manner. More importantly, however, because there is no requirement in the statute to state the legal term “vicarious liability” within the NOI, we will not hold *424plaintiff to this requirement, nor will we write such a requirement into the statute.32

This holding is also consistent with this Court’s longstanding principles forming the foundation of vicarious liability. A master is bound to keep his or her servants within their proper bounds, and is responsible if he or she does not. “The law contemplates that their acts are his acts, and that he is constructively present at them all. ”33 This Court has long held that a principal “is only liable because the law creates a practical identity with his men [agents], so that he is held to have done what they have done.”34 This longstanding legal doctrine is embodied in MCL 450.225. As previously discussed, that statute recognizes that a PC can only render professional services through its licensed health care providers. Accordingly, with regard to vicarious *425liability claims, the parties are in fact the same actor, and therefore, there is no need for a claimant to duplicate the same information in the NOI for both parties. If the information contained within the NOI is sufficient with regard to the agent, it is sufficient with regard to the principal, because they share a practical identity for purposes of that claim.

In sum, the issue is whether Huron Valley Radiology could reasonably be held to comprehend the nature of the claims being asserted against it. The NOI provided the necessary information for both the PC and the doctor to have such an understanding. The only claim asserted against Huron Valley Radiology was for the actions of Dr. Murry, and those actions were fully and adequately set forth in the NOI. Nothing more is required. We conclude that the NOI in this case was not defective and dismissal of the action is not warranted.

IV CONCLUSION

We hold that a plaintiff must provide a timely NOI to a PC before commencing a medical malpractice action when the claims alleged against the PC are predicated on its vicarious liability for a licensed health care provider who is rendering professional services. Because the claim against Huron Valley Radiology is based on vicarious liability for the professional services of its employee, a licensed health care provider, plaintiff was required to provide a timely NOI as the action is one sounding in medical malpractice.

Moreover, we conclude that the NOI filed in this case was fully compliant with the plain language of § 2912b(4), which governs its contents. First, there is no requirement in § 2912b(4) to set forth the legal relationships between named parties; rather, the plain language of § 2912b(4)(f) only requires naming each *426party to be sued. Secondly, where the only claim asserted against a PC is one for vicarious liability, and hence no other standard of care is being asserted against the PC, there is no requirement within § 2912b that mandates that a claimant set forth the legal doctrine of vicarious liability in the NOI.

The claim at issue in this case was one for vicarious liability only. In light of MCL 450.225, a PC can only render professional services through its licensed health care provider. Where the NOI names both the PC and the provider, the NOI is fully compliant so long as it sets forth all of the factual and medical information necessary to inform the PC of the nature of the claim being asserted against the physician-provider. Because this NOI meets these requirements, it is fully compliant and there is no need to dismiss this action on the basis of the NOI.

We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Furthermore, we vacate the order abeying the application for leave to appeal in Potter v McLeary (Docket Nos. 136338 and 136339) and deny the application in light of this opinion.

Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh and Weaver, JJ, concurred with Hathaway, J.

MCL 600.2912b.

Kumar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 177; 750 NW2d 121 (2008).

See id. at 172.

Conversely, when a claim asserted against a PC involves the actions of an employee or agent who is unlicensed or not rendering professional services as delineated in MCL 450.225, the NOI requirement would he unnecessary, because such a claim would sound in ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice.

Potter v McLeary, 482 Mich 1004 (2008); Potter v McLeary, 480 Mich 915 (2007); Potter v McLeary, 278 Mich App 279; 748 NW2d 599 (2008); Potter v McLeary, 274 Mich App 222; 732 NW2d 600 (2007).

Potter, 278 Mich App at 281-286.

Potter, 482 Mich at 1004.

Defendant Huron Valley Radiology addressed the sufficiency of the NOI issue extensively in its brief on appeal. This brief sets forth the sufficiency issue as one of the questions presented for us to decide. The brief also sets forth the entire content of the NOI and articulates the view that the NOI is defective. The brief cites statutes and cases to support its position. Moreover, in its prayer for relief, defendant asks us to decide the remaining issues in plaintiffs application for leave to appeal. One of the two remaining questions in plaintiffs application for leave to appeal is whether the NOI was defective. Further, plaintiff sufficiently addressed this issue at oral argument. The briefs and transcript of the oral argument can be viewed at <http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/03-09/136336/ 136336-Index.html>.

Potter v Murry, 483 Mich 922 (2009).

In re Investigation of March 1999 Riots in East Lansing, 463 Mich 378, 383; 617 NW2d 310 (2000).

Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).

Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).

Id.

Id. at 135.

Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352, 366; 750 NW2d 570, 579 (2008), quoting Sun Valley, supra at 237.

Sun Valley, supra at 237.

Herman, supra at 366.

Id.,quoting Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 472 (1995).

Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich 227, 233; 229 NW 911 (1930).

Id. at 234.

See Peters v Golds, 366 F Supp 150 (ED Mich, 1973), which held that a PC is treated as a person for purposes of § 5838a.

MCL 450.226 provides:

Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to abolish, repeal, modify, restrict or limit the law now in effect in this state applicable to the professional relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing the professional services and the person receiving such professional service and to the standards for professional conduct. Any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation organized under this act shall remain personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him, or by any person under his direct supervision and control, while rendering professional service on behalf of the corporation to the person for whom such professional services were being rendered. The corporation shall be liable up to the full value of its property for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by any of its officers, shareholders, agents or employees while they are engaged on behalf of the corporation in the rendering of professional services.

There is no dispute that the second prong of the Kuznar test has been met in this case. The claim indisputably presents questions of medical judgment outside the realm of common knowledge and experience.

Kuznar, supra at 177.

We note that satisfying the first prong of Kuznar requires more than mere inclusion within the Public Health Code lists. The service provided must also be a professional service, the determination of which requires further analysis. For example, while hospitals are included in the list, not all hospital employees, such as janitors and dietary aides, provide professional services. However, inclusion within either § 5838a or the Public Health Code lists is a necessary predicate to an action sounding in medical malpractice.

Section 5838a and § 2912b were both amended by 1993 PA 78, effective April 1, 1994.

The former § 5838a(l) provided:

A claim based on the medical malpractice of a person who is, or who holds himself or herself out to be, a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency who is engaging in or otherwise assisting in medical care and treatment, or any other health care professional, whether or not licensed by the state, accrues at the time of the act or omission which is the basis for the claim of medical malpractice, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim. As used in this subsection:

(a) “Licensed health facility or agency” means a health facility or agency licensed under article 17 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.20101 to 333.22181 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

Ob) “Licensed health care professional” means an individual licensed under article 15 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.16101 to 333.18838 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Licensed health care professional does not include a sanitarian or a veterinarian.

Moreover, it would be illogical to assume that a claimant knows the precise legal relationship between defendants. The provider may have either an actual employment relationship with the PC or they may have a complex independent contractor arrangement. While the PC can be vicariously liable for the acts of either under MCL 450.226, the statute logically imposes no requirement on the claimant to allege the precise nature of the relationship.

However, even assuming for the sake of argument that there was a requirement to set forth legal relationships in the statute, the NOI meets that burden. Plaintiffs NOI does more than merely name the entities to be sued; the NOI names Huron Valley Radiology as well as the three individual physicians and “their employees or agents, actual or ostensible, thereof.” This phrase is repeated three times throughout the NOI. This language is more than sufficient to provide Huron Valley Radiology with notice of the facts establishing the legal relationships at such an early stage of the proceeding.

Any argument that it is necessary to plead facts supporting vicarious liability or to state the phrase “vicarious liability” as part and parcel of the “factual basis of the claim” is misplaced and misreads the NOI statute. Section 2912b(4) does not contain such a requirement and we must assume that the absence of the requirement was purposeful. If the Legislature wanted such a requirement, it could have easily included it. It could have phrased § 2912b(4)(a) as “the factual and legal basis for the claim and whether the claim is for direct liability or vicarious liability.” But it did not do so. The Legislature could also have inserted additional mandates, such as requiring the claimant to set forth that the “provider is licensed to practice medicine in Michigan” or “the provider is licensed under a specific provision of the public health code.” However, again, the Legislature chose not to do so. Absent statutory guidance, we cannot impose additional requirements upon claimants. The better judicial practice is to refrain from adding requirements to a statute that are not contained within its language.

MCL 450.225.

We do not believe that this Court’s ruling in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (Roberts II), 470 Mich 679; 684 NW2d 711 (2004), is dispositive. Roberts II discussed a similar issue that arose when the plaintiff asserted claims in a manner that left confusion regarding whether the claims asserted were for direct liability, vicarious liability, or both. The Court stated:

Although it appears from plaintiffs complaint that she is claiming that the hospital and professional corporation are vicariously hable for the negligence of their agents, the notices of intent implied that plaintiff alleged direct negligence against these defendants for negligently hiring or negligently granting staff privileges to the individual defendants. [Roberts II, supra at 693.]

We question whether Roberts II was correctly decided because it adds a requirement not found in the language of the statute; namely, that statements be “particularized.” However, Roberts II opined that because there was confusion with regard to whether the claim was for direct or vicarious liability, the PC was unable to understand the nature of the claims being asserted. In the case before us, no such potential for confusion exists, and, accordingly, Roberts II is distinguishable.

Smith v Webster, 23 Mich 298, 299 (1871).

Id. at 300. See also Ducre v Sparrow-Kroll Lumber Co, 168 Mich 49, 52; 133 NW 938 (1911).

KELLY, C.J.

(concurring). I fully agree with and sign the majority opinion in this case. I write for the sole purpose of responding to Justice MARKMAN’s comments attacking the majority’s respect for the doctrine of stare decisis. In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice MARKMAN repeats a claim that he and Justices CORRIGAN and Young have published numerous times *427this term1 with the same string of citations.2 The claim is that their colleagues who comprise the majority in this case have been ignoring precedent. A review of the cases in the string citation serves to illustrate that the claim is simply false.

Justice MARKMAN claims that in Vanslembrouck v Halperin,3 the Court ignored Vega v Lakeland Hosps. 4However, Vanslembrouck is distinguishable from Vega because Vega determined that MCL 600.5851(1) is a saving provision, whereas Vanslembrouck held that MCL 600.5851(7) is a statute of limitations. Thus, these cases examined the effect of altogether different statutory provisions.

Justice MARKMAN also claims that in Hardacre v Saginaw Vascular Services,5 the Court failed to follow Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr.6However, in Hardacre, the Court denied leave to appeal because the allegations in the plaintiffs notice of intent to find an action did not need to comply with Boodt. In Hardacre, the burden of explication of the standard of care was minimal.7

*428Nor did the Court ignore precedents with which it disagrees in Sazima v Shepherd Bar & Restaurant.8 Justice MARKMAN claims that the Court failed to follow Chrysler v Blue Arrow Transport Lines.9However, Sazima involved exceptions to the “going and coming” rule as set forth in Camburn v Northwest School Dist.10Thus, the Court was not bound by Chrysler.

Justice MARKMAN next claims the Court ignored Smith v Khouri11 when it decided Juarez v Holbrook12However, in Juarez, it was undisputed that the trial court performed a reasonableness analysis in calculating the proper attorney fee award. Therefore, a remand in light of Smith was unnecessary.

In Beasley v Michigan,13the Court considered the statutory notice provision of MCL 600.6431(3). Thus, contrary to Justice Markman’s claim, the Court was not bound by Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm.14 Rowland interpreted the notice provision of MCL 600.1404(1); thus, the cases involved different statutory provisions altogether.

Likewise, Justice MARKMAN is incorrect in claiming that the Court failed to enforce Thornton v Allstate Ins Co15 and Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of *429America16 in Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co.17 In Scott, the Court of Appeals undertook a thorough analysis of the relevant no-fault jurisprudence and applied precedent as it has been understood for nearly 30 years.

Finally, the Court did not fail to abide by Rowland in Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth.18 Chambers interpreted MCL 691.1406, while Rowland interpreted MCL 691.1404(1). Thus, the cases dealt with different statutory provisions and the Court was not bound to extend Rowland to the statute at issue in Chambers.

In summary, the accusation that the Court has been ignoring precedent is incorrect. Had other justices been in the majority in some of the decisions complained about, they might well have extended existing precedent to a new area of the law. But the refusal of those in the majority in this case to so extend precedent is quite different from a refusal on their part to apply it. This is a distinction that Justices MARKMAN, CORRIGAN, and YOUNG would do well to concede.

See, e.g., Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 391-392; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (Markman, J., dissenting); Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth, 483 Mich 1081, 1082 (2009) (Corrigan, J., dissenting); Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 483 Mich 1032, 1036 (2009) (Corrigan, J., dissenting); Beasley v Michigan, 483 Mich 1025, 1027 (2009) (Corrigan, J., dissenting); Juarez v Holbrook, 483 Mich 970 (2009) (Markman, J., dissenting). Justice Young joined the dissenting statements in Chambers, Scott, Beasley, and Juarez.

Post at 478 n 23.

Vanslembrouck v Halperin, 483 Mich 965 (2009).

Vega v Lakeland Hosps at Niles-St Joseph, Inc, 479 Mich 243; 736 NW2d 561 (2007).

Hardacre v Saginaw Vascular Services, 483 Mich 918 (2009).

Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008).

See Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679, 694 n 12; 684 NW2d 711 (2004).

Sazima v Shepherd Bar & Restaurant, 483 Mich 924 (2009).

Chrysler v Blue Arrow Transport Lines, 295 Mich 606; 295 NW 331 (1940).

Camburn v Northwest School Dist (After Remand), 459 Mich 471, 478; 592 NW2d 46 (1999).

Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008).

Juarez, supra.

Beasley v Michigan, 483 Mich 1025 (2009).

Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007).

Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643; 391 NW2d 320 (1986).

Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626; 563 NW2d 683 (1997).

Scott, supra at 1032.

Chambers, supra.

Citation profile

How this case has been treated — in progress