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484 So. 2d 97

484 So.2d 97

11 Fla.L.Weekly 591

Docket No. BG-66.

Grunzel v. State

Jeffrey Alexander GRUNZEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 6, 1986.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1986-03-06

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including 2 So. 3d 132 - State v. Meshell, 576 So. 2d 953 - Saavedra v. State

“a violation of the sexual battery statute occurs whenever ... there is an intentional, nonconsensual intrusion into the sexual privacy of another.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including 576 So. 2d 389 - Russell v. State, 625 So. 2d 51 - Kirby v. State

Relies on Mize v. State · 378 So. 2d 895 - Surace v. State · 444 So. 2d 492 - Duke v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1986-03-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently September 2012

11 state decisions

501986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*98 J. Craig Williams, of Williams & Stapp, Jacksonville, for appellant.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Henry C. Cawthon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

¶3JOANOS, Judge.

¶4Grunzel appeals from a conviction for one count of burglary with an assault and two counts of sexual battery. He contends that the incident leading to his conviction should have resulted in only one count of sexual battery. We disagree with Grunzel and affirm the conviction.

¶5On September 16, 1984 Grunzel entered the victim's apartment where against her will he performed cunnilingus for a few seconds immediately before having intercourse with her. In the information Grunzel was charged with one count of burglary and two counts of sexual battery. He pled nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the determination on the number of counts of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Grunzel to seven years on each count, to run concurrently.

¶6Grunzel argues that the incident constituted only one continuous episode of sexual battery and that he was therefore wrongly convicted of two offenses. We disagree. The Florida Statutes defines sexual battery as:

oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal, or vaginal penetration of another by any other object ...

¶7s. 794.011(1)(f), F.S. (1983).

¶8It is our opinion that in this case two violations of the statute occurred. Adopting the reasoning of the Second DCA in Duke v. State, 444 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), we find each act was a sexual battery of a separate character and type which logically requires different elements of proof. Notwithstanding the short interval of time that evolved between the acts involved here, we believe each act is a separate criminal offense. Duke, at 494.

¶9The argument that cunnilingus does not meet the statutory definition of "penetration by any other object" does not advance Grunzel's appeal. The act of cunnilingus might or might not involve a penetration, depending on the facts of each case. It is, in all cases, the "oral union with the sexual organ of another." An oral union followed by any other act that fits the statutory language constitutes two separate violations of the sexual battery statute.

¶10We agree with Grunzel that if the statute were ambiguous the rules of statutory construction would require the statute be construed against the state and for the accused. However, it is clear that application of the statute to these facts was well within the intent of the legislature. Chapter 794 of Florida Statutes shows a clear intent to protect an individual's sexual privacy from violence. Aiken v. State, 390 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1980) "[A] violation of the sexual battery statute occurs whenever ... there is intentional, non-consensual intrusion into the sexual privacy of another." Surace v. State, 378 So.2d 895, 899 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (Schwartz, J., specially concurring), cert. denied 389 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 1980). See also Dorch v. State, 458 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

¶11Accordingly, we affirm.

¶12SHIVERS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.

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