Jones v. Allen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “uses the same three-drug cocktail as nearly every other state where substantially similar challenges have been madé”); State by State Lethal Injection, Death Penalty Information Center, https;// deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection. (last visited July 12, 2017) (collecting state-by-state execution protocols and explaining”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Grayson v. Warden · Carey Dale Grayson v. Warden, Commissioner, Alabama DOC

2. “[t]he crux of [such] challenge^] to the lethal injection protocol — despite other general allegations about the training of the prison staff, etc. — is that the first of the three drugs (sodium thiopental) ... will not induce a sufficiently deep plane of anesthesia [before] ... the third, excruciatingly painful and death-inducing drug (potassium chloride) is administered. Regardless of the confidentiality of the State’s protocol, [plaintiff Aaron Lee] Jones cannot assert that he was unaware of the fact that [Alabama] (like almost every other state that carries out executions using lethal injection) employs this three-drug cocktail. Any such assertion is belied by his complaint, which alleges “upon information and belief’ that the State uses “Thiopental, Pavulon, and Potassium Chloride ... to achieve first anesthesia, then paralysis, and finally ... cardiac arrest.” Thus, Jones knew of the basis of his claim before he filed his complaint.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Grayson v. Allen

3. “... Jones would have been entitled to a trial on the merits had he brought his suit in time to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay, but he did not. Thus, the strong presumption against a stay operates against Jones. The mere setting of a trial date in another case does not increase whatever preexisting risk there was that a mistake will be made in his imminent execution (and cause pain that rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment). In fact, the equitable considerations in each case are naturally different. Thus, the mere possibility of a trial date in another case does not affect the balancing of the equities in this case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 156 F. Supp. 3d 1340 - Grayson v. Dunn