Flentye v. Kathrein’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (§ 1 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (§ 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 28 U.S.C. § 1338 · 28 U.S.C. § 1367
Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. · Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. · Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. · 161 Ill. 2d 374 - Doe v. Calumet City
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Even if there were no allegations that Kathrein registered the website, Plaintiffs have made allegations that Kathrein has engaged in a violation of the ACPA as the alter ego of Lee, as discussed above. (D.E. 15 ¶ 4.) A plaintiff can pursue a trademark infringement claim under a veil-piercing theory, Bally Schuhfabriken AG v. Bally Manufacturing Corp., No. 92 C 0312, 1992 WL 80554 , at (N.D.Ill., Apr. 8, 1992) (collecting authority), and Plaintiffs can presumably do the same with an ACPA claim, since both trademark infringement and ACPA claims are advanced under the Lanham Act. The ACPA does contain a specific provision (that does not apply to the Lanham Act generally) stating that “[a] person shall be liable for using a domain name ... only if that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant’s authorized licensee.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(D). However, if Kathrein is deemed to be the alter ego of Lee or Lee Street, Kathrein seemingly would be deemed the “registrant” under the statute, since “the separate personality]” of Kathrein would “no longer exist.” Sea-Land Servs., 993 F.2d at 1311.[ 9 ] Therefore, based on the allegations in the Complaint, Kathrein seemingly could be considered the “domain name registrant or that registrant’s au- thorized licensee.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(D).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.