Tommy G. Shead v. Donald L. Quatsoe, Muriel Douglas Black v. Wilbur Schmidt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements. The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation, and a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should' be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case, in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.” (p. 790-791, 93 S.Ct. p. 1764)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 419 F. Supp. 1279 - Cresci v. Schmidt

2. ““ * * * Nevertheless, the basic analysis in the opinion indicates that if ‘fundamental fairness — the touchstone of due process’ was offended by a revocation which happened to precede the date of the Searpelli decision, the date of the revocation hearing should not necessarily foreclose relief. Just as the wide variations in the peculiarities of particular cases foreclose the use of an inflexible rule for deciding the merits of a claim that counsel was improperly refused, we believe that the fundamental fairness concept forecloses reliance on the date of the Searpelli decision as an inflexible bar to relief.” (p. 695)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 419 F. Supp. 1279 - Cresci v. Schmidt