IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
QUENTIN DANIEL MOORE,
Appellant,
No 805 h LE D
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, MAY 0 7 021
Respondent.
ELIZABETH A.1: • OWN
CLERK OF E COL!
1;
ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN P'
AND REMANDING
This is a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant
to a jury verdict, of murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with
the use of a deadly weapon, discharging a firearm within or from a vehicle,
challenge to fight, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Second
Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Scott N. Freeman, Judge.
The State charged appellant Quentin Moore via information
with various crimes based on an argument that took place at a 7-11
convenience store and a fatal shooting in South Reno. In June 2018, Moore
and two companions ran into a 7-11 to confront Paul Dobbins and two of his
companions. An argument ensued between the two groups involving yelling
and cussing. Eventually, the two groups left the 7-11, but no fight occurred.
About a week later, Moore and some companions drove to a house party in
South Reno. As they approached the house party, Moore saw a person he
did not like, got out of the car with a handgun, and began to argue with him.
Either Moore or this person challenged the other to "[do around the corner,"
to "[m]eet me at the corner," or to "[do to the corner," to which they agreed.
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Dobbins was also at the party with some friends and, at some
point, realized that Moore was there. Dobbins grabbed a rifle from a friend's
car and walked to the middle of the street. Moore and Dobbins faced each
other in the street and gunfire ensued. Once the shooting began, Moore
went back to the car he arrived in, stood inside the car with the car door
open, and continued discharging his firearm as one of his companions drove
the car away. Another of Moore's companions also discharged a firearm
from inside of the car and fatally wounded Dobbins. After an 11-day trial,
the jury found Moore guilty of all crimes the State charged.
On appeal, Moore argues that insufficient evidence supports his
convictions for murder with the use of a deadly weapon and challenge to
fight and that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. We begin
with Moore's sufficiency of the evidence challenges and then address
Moore's challenges to his sentence.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must decide
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."' McNair v. State, 108
Nev. 53, 56,
825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
We begin with Moore's conviction of murder with the use of a
deadly weapon. When the State presents "alternate theories of criminal
liability" to the jury "and all of the theories are legally valid," we will affirm
the general verdict even if sufficient evidence only supports one of the
theories. Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. 908, 913,
124 P.3d 191, 194 (2005),
'Moore argues and the State concedes that one of Moore's companions
fired the shot that fatally wounded Dobbins.
2
receded from on other grounds by Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1026-27,
195 P.3d 315, 324 (2008).
Here, the State relied upon a theory of aiding and abetting
murder with the use of a deadly weapon, among others, to secure a
conviction from the jury. NRS 195.020 provides that "[e]very person
concerned in the commission of a felony . . . , whether the person directly
commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its
commission . . . is a principal, and shall be proceeded against and punished
as such." For a trier of fact to properly hold a defendant "accountable for
the specific intent crime of another under an aiding or abetting theory of
principal liability, the aider or abettor must have knowingly aided the other
person with the intent that the other person commit the charged crime."
Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648, 655,
56 P.3d 868, 872 (2002).
Here, Detective Wright, relying upon her written report of her
interview with a witness, testified to the jury that Moore walked to the
corner and fired at Dobbins.2 The jury also heard testimony from witnesses
that Moore and a companion fired at Dobbins from the threshold of the
vehicle Moore arrived in while a different companion drove the car away
from the house party. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the
State, we conclude that a rational juror could find that Moore aided or
abetted murder with the use of a deadly weapon. See Valdez v. State, 124
Nev. 1172, 1197,
196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008) ([Tille jury may infer intent to
kill from the manner of the defendant's use of a deadly weapon.").
2At trial, the witness testified that he did not remember his
conversation with Detective Wright. Moore does not otherwise challenge
the admissibility of Detective Wright's testimony on appeal. Nevertheless,
"it is the jury's function, not that of the court, to . . . determine the
credibility of witnesses." McNair, 108 Nev. at 56,
825 P.2d at 573.
3
Accordingly, we conclude that Moore is not entitled to relief on this ground
and we affirm his conviction for murder with the use of a deadly weapon.
We now turn to Moore's gross misdemeanor conviction for
challenge to fight. Under NRS 200.450(1)(a), a person who "gives . . . a
challenge verbally or in writing to fight any other person" is subject to
punishment for a gross misdemeanor if "the fight does not involve the use
of a deadly weapon."3 We have previously recognized that for a conviction
under this statute, the challenge must lead to an actual fight. Pimentel v.
State, 133 Nev. 218, 225,
396 P.3d 759, 765 (2017) (holding that "NRS
200.450 does not criminalize speech because without an ensuing fight there
is no criminal liability" (emphasis added)); Wilmeth v. State,
96 Nev. 403,
405,
610 P.2d 735, 737 (1980) (The statute proscribes the conveyance or
acceptance of a challenge to fight when such a fight or confrontation
results."). Here, the State did not present any evidence that Moore and his
companions fought Dobbins and his companions at the 7-11 convenience
store. Instead, a witness testified that Dobbins and his companions left the
7-11 without fighting Moore and his companions. Accordingly, we conclude
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
verdict regarding the challenge to fight charge. We therefore order the
district court to vacate Moore's conviction for challenge to fight and the
corresponding concurrent sentence of 364 days in the Washoe County jail.
Lastly, Moore also argues that the district court abused its
sentencing discretion by not stating factual findings on the record regarding
3Under NRS 200.450(1)(b), the crime is punishable as a Category B
felony if "the fight involves the use of a deadly weapon." When a death
results from "such a fighe the crime is punishable as a first degree murder,
pursuant to NRS 200.450(3).
4
Moore's deadly weapon enhancement and by imposing consecutive
sentences without articulating its reasoning. We disagree with both
contentions.
NRS 193.165(1) requires a district court to consider five factors
when determining the length of a deadly weapon enhancement4 and we
have construed that statute to require "district courts to articulate factual
findings, on the record, regarding each of the factore present in the statute.
Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 643,
218 P.3d 501, 507 (2009). While
Moore is correct that the district court failed to articulate such findings on
the record, merely stating that it "considered the factors statutorily," Moore
failed to object to the sufficiency of these findings during sentencing.
Therefore, we "will grant relief only if [Moore] demonstrates plain error."
Id. at 644,
218 P.3d at 507. To warrant reversal under plain-error review,
Moore must demonstrate "that the error affected his . . . substantial rights,
by causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice." Valdez, 124 Nev. at
1190,
196 P.3d at 477 (internal quotations omitted); see NRS 178.602 (Plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they
were not brought to the attention of the court."). Moore makes no argument
on appeal that the district court's failure to elaborate on each factor caused
him any prejudice. We therefore conclude that the district court did not
plainly err in not stating factual findings on the record regarding Moore's
deadly weapon enhancement.
4These factors are: "(a) [t]he facts and circumstances of the crime; (b)
[t]he criminal history of the person; (c) [t]he impact of the criine on any
victim; (d) [a]ny mitigating factors presented by the person; and (e) [a]ny
other relevant information." NRS 193.165(1).
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We also conchide that Moore's argument regarding the district
court's imposition of consecutive sentences without articulating its reason
is unpersuasive. NRS 176.035 does not require a district court to articulate
reasons in imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences and we have never
imposed such a requirement on district courts. Campbell v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 114 Nev. 410, 414,
957 P.2d 1141, 1143 (1998). Rather, we have
stated that such "action is best left to the Negislature." Id. The
Legislature has yet to do so, and we decline to impose such a requirement
here. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in
imposing consecutive sentences without articulating its reasoning.
Therefore, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN
PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the
district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
J.
Cadish
J.
Herndon
cc: Hon. Scott N. Freeman, District Judge
Washoe County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
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