486 So. 2d 1101 - State v. McGuffey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where the prejudicial remarks result in substantial prejudice to the defendant and make it impossible for him to obtain a fair trial. State v. Burdgess, 434 So.2d 1062 (La.1983); State v. Johnson, 440 So.2d 838 (La.App.2d Cir.1983). The trial judge, instead of granting a mistrial, may admonish the jury when he believes that an admonition is sufficient to assure defendant a fair trial. State v. Michel, 422 So.2d 1115 (La.1982). Moreover, a mistrial is a drastic remedy which is only authorized where such substantial prejudice would otherwise result to the accused. State v. Smith [ 418 So.2d 515 (La.1982) ], supra; State v. Johnson, supra. ... In the absence of clear prejudice, a witness' unsolicited reference to other crimes by the accused warrants only an admonition that the jury disregard the objection or remark. However, a prejudicial remark by an experienced police officer should be viewed with considerable concern as to the fairness of the trial and it may require granting a mistrial, especially if the remark was precipitated by or should have been anticipated by the district attorney. Nevertheless, the decision as to the necessity of granting a mistrial or the circumstances is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Goods [ 403 So.2d 1205 (La. 1981) ], supra; State v. Odds, 430 So.2d 1269 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). Although the Supreme Court has held that a police officer's unsolicited, unresponsive reference to a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Boyd

2. “Circumstantial evidence is not inherently less reliable than direct evidence. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); CCrP Art. 798(3); State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983). Any man would accept dog tracks in the mud against the sworn testimony of a hundred eyewitnesses that no dog passed by. The gist and the key to circumstantial evidence is the inference or process of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached. Chism, supra, at p. 469 . LRS 15:438 is an evidentiary guide for the jury and a tool or methodology for the reviewing court to employ in determining whether the rational juror in the Jackson v. Virginia constitutional due process test might have concluded that defendant’s alternative hypothesis of innocence is sufficiently treasonable to conclude that the evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chism, supra; State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984). The test, whether expressed in terms of doubt or of hypothesis, is the reasonableness of the ultimate conclusion on the facts and inferences which may be drawn from those facts in the particular case. Compare State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1982), and State v. Rault, 445 So.2d 1203 (La.1984). In some cases, “the defendant’s circumstantial theory [or hypothesis] is [found to be] remote [or unreasonable] ...” when it is compared “... with the prosecution’s hypothesis of defendant’s guilt, which is consistent overall”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Cann

3. “(2) When the remark or comment is made by a witness or person other than the judge, district attorney, or a court official, regardless of whether the remark or comment is within the scope of Article 770. In such case, on motion of the defendant, the court may grant a mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the defendant a fair trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 588 So. 2d 805 - State v. Jones