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487 N.E.2d 150

Micinski v. State

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided January 22, 1986

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1986-01-22

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“knowledge that there was an injury accident.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Abney v. State

Relies on State v. Edgman · Runyon v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1986-01-22

How this case has been cited

Cited by 45 later decisions — most recently August 2016 · most notably State v. Bey (1988), 126 Wash. 2d 443 - State v. Rivas (1995)

1 federal appellate · 44 state decisions

1401986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

GIVAN, Chief Justice,

¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶2I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion reversing the trial court as to the conviction of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury.

¶3I agree with the observations made by Judge Miller in his opinion in the Court of Appeals in this case. I do not agree with the conclusion he draws from those observations. I have the same problem with the majority opinion in this case. Although the majority correctly indicates the trial judge is requesting direction on appeal as to how matters of this nature should be handled, I feel the majority opinion will not aid him a great deal in that regard.

¶4The majority opinion at least implies that it was reversible error to refuse to give the instruction tendered by appellant. However, that instruction is incomplete and incorrect so far as the law as set forth in Runyon v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E.2d 235, which is cited in both Judge Miller’s opinion and the majority opinion of this Court. Judge Miller also makes a correct statement of the law, citing several authorities from other jurisdictions.

¶5Appellant’s proposed Instruction No. 4, quoted in the majority opinion, is defective in that it would mislead the jury into thinking that no conviction would be possible on a charge of leaving the scene of an accident unless the State could prove that the defendant had knowledge that there was an injury involved in the accident. The defect is that it would be impossible for the State to ever prove the actual state of mind or knowledge of the defendant at the time of the accident.

¶6Whether or not the defendant had knowledge must be determined from the surrounding facts as found by the jury. The knowledge in almost any hit-and-run case must be implied from the facts. This is clearly set out by the cases cited by Judge Miller in his opinion and the majority opinion in this Court. Had the tendered instruction read in part, “had knowledge or he reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident that injury was involved,” the jury could have made their decision based upon the facts in the case without a great deal of difficulty. The instruction as tendered by the appellant was incomplete; therefore, the refusal to give the instruction as tendered should not be used as a reason for reversal. See State v. Edgman (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 1091.

¶7I would therefore affirm the trial court in all things.

¶8PIVARNIK, J., concurs.

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