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← 487 SO2D 721 - Gagnet v. Zummo

Gagnet v. Zummo’s Empirical Analysis

1986

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
1
states following
November 2014
most recently cited

12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently November 2014

12 state decisions

601986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 341 So. 2d 332 - Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc. · 373 So. 2d 498 - Reck v. Stevens · 388 So. 2d 707 - Ragas v. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. · 440 So. 2d 805 - Ketcher v. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co. · Ray v. DeFelice Marine Contractors, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"In determining whether an award of damages is inadequate or excessive we must first inquire whether [trier of fact's] award for particular injuries and their effect upon the injured person was a clear abuse of the trier of fact's `much discretion.' On appellate review it is only after an articulated analysis of the facts discloses an abuse of discretion that an award may for stated reasons be considered either excessive or insufficient. Only after making a determination of abuse can an appellate court disturb the award and then only to the extent of lowering it or raising it to the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that judge or jury. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979); Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1977); Bourgeois v. Bill Watson's Investments, Inc., 458 So.2d 167 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1984)."”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “"Plaintiff contends that there is no authority for such a procedure. This we concede but we know of no statue or codal provision that prohibits such a procedure and sanction the same under the following conditions: There first must be a tender to and refusal to accept by the judgment creditor. The tender and/or the deposit must be for the full amount of the judgment, including costs and interest. It must be unconditional and constitute a complete waiver of any future defense as to liability on the part of the judgment debtor. Acceptance of the tender and/or withdrawal of the funds by the judgment creditor(s) is without prejudice to any of its (their) rights to appeal as to quantum. In the event of an increase in quantum on appeal, the judgment debtor is liable for all additional costs together with legal interest on the amount of the increase from date of judicial demand until paid. Under the above, the advantages to both the judgment creditor and debtor are apparent. The former has the benefit of his money and the latter is relieved of certain additional costs and neither is harmed."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “all jurors insured by the defendants are subject to challenge for cause.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.