Hill v. Dunaway’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 59 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 61 later decisions — most recently March 2013 · most notably 556 So. 2d 303 - McDaniel v. Ritter (1989), 608 So. 2d 1149 - Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley (1992)
1 federal appellate · 59 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 13 Cal. 3d 804 - Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. · 319 So. 2d 652 - Paymaster Oil Mill Company v. Mitchell · 211 So. 2d 509 - Mitchell v. Craft · 459 So. 2d 793 - Fairchild v. State · Landrum v. Roddy
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“By analogy to our familiar test as to when any fact question may be taken from the jury, our rule is this: The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial courtand this Court on appealcan say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find the facts in accordance with the theory of the requested instruction.”
20 later decisions quote this exact passage“A party to an action is entitled to have the jury instructed regarding a genuine issue of material fact so long as there is credible evidence in the record which would support the instruction.”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage“An invitee is a person who goes upon the premises of another because of an express o[r] implied invitation of the occupant and for their mutual advantage. If you find that the plaintiff was an invitee when he was on the premises of Kaye Warren, then it was Kaye Warren's duty to keep her premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn him of dangerous conditions not reasonably apparent to him. Kaye Warren was not [a] guarantor of the plaintiffs safety. A party in control or possession of the premises is liable for injury to an invitee caused by a dangerous condition on the premises only if she knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the condition and failed to take measures reasonably calculated to remove the danger or warn an invitee of its existence. However, there is no duty to warn the invitee of a defect or danger which is known to him or which was as well known to him as to the occupant. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that plaintiff either knew about the dangerous condition, if any existed, which he claims caused the injury, or he knew as much about the condition as did Kaye Warren, then your verdict shall be for Kaye Warren.”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.