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← 489 F.2d 1098 - Smith v. Cherry

Smith v. Cherry’s Empirical Analysis

489 F.2d 1098 · 1973

Citation profile

79
cited by 79 later decisions
3
states following
March 2021
most recently cited

37 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 79 later decisions — most recently March 2021 · most notably Duncan v. Poythress (1981), Means v. Wilson (1975)

37 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions

420197319801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Civil Rights Act of 1957) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Baker v. Carr · Reynolds v. Sims · Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. · Wisconsin v. Constantineau · Snowden v. Hughes

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[i] f the plaintiffs prove an agreement that Cherry would be a stand-in candidate, and show a reasonable possibility that Cherry’s sham candidacy affected the outcome of the election, then the district court should order new primary and general elections.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “clearly debased the rights of all voters in the election”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Organization Voters and Swing Voters were both “tricked” into voting for Palmer when they thought they were voting for Cherry. But the impact of this deception fell unequally on the two groups of voters, because the Organization Voters would have voted for Palmer anyway, whereas the Swing Voters would have voted against him. By deceiving the Swing Voters, the conspiracy allegedly enabled Palmer to win an election he could not have won had he openly been on the ballot. The conspiracy defeated Smith, who allegedly would have won an honest election against Palmer. Thus the conspiracy worked “in favor of the ins and against the outs.” Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d 267, 270 (7th Cir. 1970). Swing Voters and Smith Voters were “denied an opportunity to win votes” (Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 , 89 S.Ct. 5 [, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 ]) and suffered an unequal burden on their right “to cast their votes effectively.” Id. at 30 , 89 S.Ct. 11 . The Smith Voters were denied an equal opportunity “to associate for the advancement of political beliefs” with the Swing Voters. Id. at 30 , 89 S.Ct. at 10. These claims of deliberate discrimination against Swing Voters and Smith Voters stated a cause of action for violation of rights protected by the equal protection clause.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.