Dewell v. Lawson’s Empirical Analysis
489 F.2d 877 · 1974
Citation profile
47 federal appellate · 31 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 113 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2007 · most notably Estelle v. Gamble (1976), Rizzo v. Goode (1976)
47 federal appellate · 31 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Monroe v. Pape · Bell v. Hood · Pierson v. Ray · Tenney v. Brandhove
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 113 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Appellant Dewell concedes that to be actionable under 1988, the acts of Chief Lawson complained of must have been done: (a) under color of state or local law; and (b) amount to a deprivation of a federal constitutionally protected right which, in this case, is freedom from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Dewell argues that Chief Lawson’s failure to establish procedures and to train personnel to protect against the damage which resulted to Dewell’s person following his arrest and incarceration by reason of his diabetic condition is actionable as Lawson was negligent in not supervising his subordinates, citing to Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388 , 447 F.2d 358 (1971), rev’d on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 [ 93 S.Ct. 602 , 34 L.Ed.2d 613 ] While recognizing that cruel and unusual punishment, as a constitutional concept, is a principle which has not traditionally lent itself to precise definition, Dewell argues that conduct may be actionable as a deprivation of constitutional rights where no force or violence has been utilized and where the conduct constitutes an act of omission. Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1972); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 [ 92 S.Ct. 83 , 30 L.Ed.2d 110 ], ... The standard of liability in a case alleging cruel and unusual punishment relating to a claimed omission of medical care is whether the plaintiff proves exceptional circumstances and conduct so grossly incompetent, inade”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Clappier v. Flynn““[PJublic officials are entitled to a privilege defense which is to be found somewhere in the area between that of legislators . . . and that of police officers . . . taking into consideration all of the factors including the broadness of the duties imposed and the extent of the powers granted to the particular public officials in the exercise of those duties.” At 882. (emphasis in opinion)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Smith v. Wickline
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.