IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
JULIO CESAR CHAVEZ, JR., No. 81319
Appellant,
vs.
BOB BENNETT, EXECUTIVE FILED
DIRECTOR FOR THE ATHLETIC
COMMISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT JUN 5 2021
OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, A. BROWN
UPR E
STATE OF NEVADA; AND NEVADA
DEPUTY CLERK
STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION,
Res • ondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment
and denying a preliminary injunction. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; James Crockett, Judge.
Appellant Julio Cesar Chavez, Jr. is a professional boxer.
Chavez's promoter, Matchroom Boxing USA, LLC, requested a permit for a
boxing match featuring Chavez to take place at the MGM Grand Garden
Arena in Las Vegas, Nevada. After Chavez promoted the match on social
media, a representative from respondent Nevada State Athletic
Commission (NSAC) attempted to perform a random drug test on Chavez
under Nevada's anti-doping laws. Chavez refused to submit for the test.
Respondent Bob Bennett, the executive director of NSAC, notified Chavez
that he was temporarily suspended pending formal disciplinary
proceedings.
After a hearing on the matter, NSAC extended Chavez's
temporary suspension until his disciplinary matter was resolved. Chavez
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then filed a complaint against Bennett and NSAC1 in the district court,
arguing that disciplining a non-licensed boxer was unconstitutional and
that the temporary suspension violated his substantive due process rights.
Chavez also applied for an ex parte temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the temporary suspension.
The district court granted a TRO through the conclusion of trial.
About one month later, Bennett moved to dismiss Chavez's complaint and
to dissolve the TRO. Bennett argued that Chavez had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, and that the TRO
had impermissibly lasted beyond NRCP 65(b)'s 14-day time limit. Chavez
countermoved for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that
Chavez had failed to first exhaust his administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review, and granted Bennett's motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment. The court also found that it must
necessarily dissolve the TRO, and denied Chavez's countermotion.
On appeal, Chavez argues that NSAC did not have personal
jurisdiction over him, the district court erred by granting summary
judgment because he is exempt from the exhaustion doctrine, and the
district court abused its discretion by dissolving the TRO.
We must first address whether NSAC had personal jurisdiction
over Chavez before reaching the other issues. We review a determination
of personal jurisdiction de novo. Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 30, 35,
342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015). Personal
jurisdiction exists where the defendant has "minimum contacts with the
forum state and an exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional
We refer to the respondents collectively as "Bennete unless the
1
context warrants referring to them separately.
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notions of fair play and substantial justice." Catholic Diocese of Green Bay,
Inc. v. John Doe 119, 131 Nev. 246, 249,
349 P.3d 518, 520 (2015).
"[S]pecific jurisdiction is proper only where the cause of action
arises from the defendant's contacts with the forum." Fulbright, 131 Nev.
at 37, 342 P.3d at 1002 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mhe defendant must purposefully avail himself of
the privilege of acting in the forum state or of
causing important consequences in that state. The
cause of action must arise from the consequences in
the forum state of the defendant's activities, and
those activities, or the consequences thereof, must
have a substantial enough connection with the
forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant reasonable.
Id. at 38, 342 P.3d at 1002 (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, "a
strict causal relationship" is not required between the defendant's in-state
activities and the litigation. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). This court may also find specific
jurisdiction where the defendant's in-state activities "relate to" the contacts
in the forum. Id.
Here, the uncontested facts demonstrate that Chavez's
promoter, Matchroom Boxing USA, LLC, submitted, under penalty of
perjury, a permit request for a boxing match between Chavez and Daniel
Jacobs to take place on December 20, 2019, at the MGM Grand Garden
Arena in Las Vegas, Nevada. Chavez also promoted the match on social
media, stating it would happen in Las Vegas on December 20 during a video
live stream and in a retweet on Twitter. Therefore, Chavez purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of acting in Nevada, and we conclude NSAC
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has made a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction over
Chavez.2
We next address whether the district court erred by granting
summary judgment because Chavez failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Chavez argues he is exempt from the exhaustion doctrine
because he raises constitutional questions and seeking administrative relief
is futile. We disagree.
"[A] person generally must exhaust all available administrative
remedies before initiating a lawsuit, and failure to do so renders the
controversy nonjusticiable." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. 565, 571,
170 P.3d 989, 993 (2007). However, there are exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine, including where the issue solely concerns the interpretation or
constitutionality of a statute, and where seeking administrative relief
would be futile. Malecon Tobacco, LLC v. State ex rel. Dep't of Taxation, 118
Nev. 837, 839,
59 P.3d 474, 476 (2002).
As to the first, when a party challenges the constitutionality of
a statute, we apply the exhaustion doctrine differently depending on
whether the statute is challenged on its face or challenged as it applies to
the party. Id. at 840-41,
59 P.3d at 476-77. A statute challenged on its face
is essentially a question of law, and exhaustion is not required because an
administrative agency's decision "will rarely aid in the ultimate judicial
2We also note that NSAC's personal jurisdiction over Chavez is
interwoven through the statutory scheme and administrative code. See
NRS 467.070(1); NRS 467.0103; NRS 467.0108(1)-(2)(a); NRS 467.117; NRS
467.153; NRS 467.158(5); NAC 467.00395(1); NAC 467.004(3); NAC
467.089; NAC 467.570(1); NAC 467.5705(1); NAC 467.885(2), (4). And we
are unconvinced that an unarmed combatant must be licensed in order for
NSAC to obtain personal jurisdiction. See NRS 467.158(5).
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resolution of the claim." See id. at 840,
59 P.3d at 476 (internal quotation
marks and punctuation omitted). But where resolution of the constitutional
issue relies on factual determinations, a party must exhaust his
administrative remedies before seeking review in the district court. Id.; see
also Int? Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 132, 157,
127 P.3d 1088, 1106 (2006) (explaining agencies are in the best position to
determine fact-based issues).
As to the second exception, seeking an administrative remedy
is futile when the agency's statute of limitations prevents the party from
bringing a claim. See State, Dep't of Taxation v. Scotsman Mfg. Co., 109
Nev. 252, 255,
849 P.2d 317, 320 (1993); see also Benson v. State Ener,
131
Nev. 772, 777,
358 P.3d 221, 225 (2015) (addressing Scotsman
Manufacturing and the futility exception). Exhaustion is also futile when
the "administrative agency clearly lacks jurisdiction." Engelrnann v.
Westergard, 98 Nev. 348, 353,
647 P.2d 385, 389 (1982).
Here, Chavez was temporarily suspended pending a formal
hearing, and NSAC has not yet made a final decision regarding the
suspension. Therefore, Chavez has not exhausted his administrative
remedies, and we must determine whether Chavez's claims before the
district court fall within the two exceptions he raised on appeal. We
conclude that Chavez's claims do not fall under either exception. Chavez's
claims regarding subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction do
not concern the constitutionality of a statute. Additionally, Chavez's
constitutional claims are as-applied challenges that require additional
factual findings. Furthermore, we believe that additional factual findings
would be helpful to this court to understand when NSAC's jurisdiction is
triggered.
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As to futility, seeking administrative relief is not futile here
where the issue of jurisdiction is not clear and where administrative
remedies remain available. And, while the NSAC Chairperson stated that
it was his belief that the agency cannot determine whether a statute is
constitutional, administrative agencies have the authority to interpret the
statutes they are charged with administering. Intl Game Tech., 122 Nev.
at 157,
127 P.3d at 1106. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
properly granted summary judgment for failure to first exhaust
administrative remedies, Wood v. Safeway, Inc.,
121 Nev. 724, 729,
121 P.3d
1026, 1029 (2005), and we conclude Chavez must obtain a final decision
from NSAC before seeking judicial review.
We also briefly address whether the district court abused its
discretion by dissolving the TRO. Coronet Homes, Inc. v. Mylan, 84 Nev.
435, 437,
442 P.2d 901, 902 (1968) (The granting, refusing or dissolving of
injunctions or restraining orders is a matter of discretion."). The parties
dispute whether the order was a TRO or a preliminary injunction. However,
because the injunction exceeded 14 days and was ordered to stand until a
trial on the merits, we conclude that it acted as a preliminary injunction.
See NRCP 65(b) (establishing that, with an exception not applicable here, a
TRO may not exceed 14 days). Therefore, when the district court properly
granted summary judgment, the preliminary injunction necessarily and
automatically dissolved at the same time. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC
Bank N.V.,
590 F.3d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (A preliminary injunction
imposed [under FRCP 65] dissolves ipso facto when a final judgment is
entered in the cause."); see also Exec. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
118
Nev. 46, 53,
38 P.3d 872, 876 (2002) CFederal cases interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 'are strong persuasive authority, because the
6
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure are based in large part upon their federal
counterparts."' (quoting Las Vegas Novelty. Inc. v. Fernandez, 106 Nev. 113,
119,
787 P.2d 772, 776 (1990))).3
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
7 CJ
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Stiglich
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Silver
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Pickering
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3In light of our decision, we do not address Chavez's remaining
arguments, which we conclude are without merit.
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cc: Chief Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court
Eighth Judicial District Court, Department 24
Goodman Law Group, APC
Attorney General/Carson City
Attorney General/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
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