IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
QUINTON ARTHUR WILLIAMS, No. 76669
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, FILE
Respondent.
JUN 3 11 2021
ELVAL r TN À. BROVM
CLE
DEPUTY CLERK
ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a
jury verdict, of battery on a protected person.1 Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Tierra Danielle Jones, Judge.
Appellant Quinton Williams argues that he did not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel when he exercised
his right to represent himself at trial. Specifically, Williams contends that
he did not understand the nature of the proceedings and the justice court
conducted an insufficient canvass. When a defendant seeks to waive his
right to counsel, the district court must ensure that the defendant is
competent and the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212,
111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005). A waiver is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when a defendant is "made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we conclude that oral argument is not
warranted.
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open." Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 53-54,
176 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2008)
(quoting Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). The defendant
should understand "the elements of each crime" charged, including "the
possible penalties or punishments, and the total possible sentence the
defendant could receive" if convicted. SCR 253(3)(f), (g).
Williams first announced his desire to represent himself at his
initial appearance in justice court. The justice court conducted a Faretta
canvass. During the canvass, the justice court asked Williams questions
about the nature of self-representation. However, the record does not show
that Williams adequately understood the elements of the charged crime or
the possible sentence he could receive. And throughout the canvass
Williams did not appear to understand the nature of the proceedings.
Williams repeatedly stated that he would "accept [the charge] for value" and
sought to "discharge this debt."
During Williams's first appearance in district court, a hearing
master continued the arraignment so that the district court could conduct a
Faretta canvass. At the subsequent arraignment, when asked if he
understood the proceedings, Williams answered "somewhat." However, the
district court never recanvassed Williams. Instead, the district court opted
to let the justice court canvass "stand." The district court's decision is
problematic because "the purpose of a preliminary hearing and a trial are
vastly different and therefore the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the two stages are also different." Hooks, 124 Nev. at 56,
176 P.3d at 1086. And this court has found "that a Faretta canvass before
a preliminary hearing in justice court will rarely be sufficient, standing
2
alone, to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right
to counsel at trial in the district court." Id. at 53,
176 P.3d at 1084.
Furthermore, Williams did not appear to understand the nature of the
proceedings throughout. During a pretrial hearing, Williams appeared to
think that he was being sued in a civil action and submitted what he
considered a petition to discharge through bankruptcy. When the district
court explained that the criminal charge was not a civil action, Williams
asked, "What have I done criminal?" These issues should have signaled to
the district court that a separate Faretta canvass was warranted before
trial. Further, at sentencing, Williams sought to "pay the debt off rather
than "going [to] jail." While Williams's unorthodox beliefs in line with being
a "sovereign citizen" alone do not show that he was incompetent to waive
his right to counsel and represent himself, see United States v. Neal, 776
F.3d 645, 657 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that the "[defendant's] comments
and conduct were indicative of [his sovereign citizen] belief, not a lack of
competence[, and he] cannot now use those beliefs as an expression of
incompetency"), the record here supports the conclusion that Williams did
not understand the nature of the proceedings or potential punishment he
faced.
Therefore, we conclude that the record as a whole does not
demonstrate that Williams knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
44
his right to counsel—particularly given that we 'indulge in every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of the right to counsel." Hooks, 124
Nev. at 57,
176 P.3d at 1086 (quoting Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 404
(1977)). "Because harmless-error analysis does not apply to an invalid
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(01 I947A AtIDID
waiver of the right to counsel," reversal is warranted.2 Id. at 57-58, 176
P.3d at 1086-87. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for a new trial.
Parra guirre
R•al3c,--0 , J.
Stiglich
LIZ44,0 , J.
Silver
cc: Hon. Tierra Danielle Jones, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
2Wil1iams raises several other issues on appeal. In light of our
decision to reverse the judgment of conviction based on Williams's invalid
waiver of his constitutional right to counsel, we need not address his
remaining arguments.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
101 1947A 1401.
