majority">

*144OPINION OF THE COURT

O’BRIEN, Justice.

This is a petition by the Commonwealth for review of an order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Criminal Division, reinstating bail for respondent, Davico Cabeza, during the pendency of his post-verdict motions.

On February 25, 1979, respondent Cabeza was, together with his mother, arrested in Philadelphia at the scene of the killing of Helen Cook. Cabeza was charged with murder, was tried by a jury, and on November 3,1979, was convicted of murder of the first degree. On that date the trial court revoked Cabeza’s bail, which had been set at $10,000, and remanded him to the custody of the Sheriff.

Ten days later, on November 13,1979, respondent filed an application for reinstatement of bail; the application was denied. On January 4, 1980, the trial court convened for a hearing on yet another application for reinstatement of bail, which on this occasion it granted.

The rule in this Commonwealth concerning the granting of bail to persons convicted of murder of the first degree is embodied in Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010(A)(1):

“Capital and Life Imprisonment Cases. The Defendant shall not be released on bail upon a finding of guilty of an offense which is punishable by death or life imprisonment.1 However, if post-verdict motions are not disposed of within a reasonable period of time thereafter, the judge may in his discretion allow bail.”

At the January 4, 1980, hearing the trial court found that the delay of two months between conviction and the disposition of post-verdict motions, coupled with the estimate of the court reporter that transcription of the notes of trial testimony would not be completed for “another two to three more weeks,” constituted “unreasonable delay” as contemplated by Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010(A)(1). Hence the trial court concluded whether or not to grant bail was a decision within *145its discretion. Armed with this conclusion the court reinstated bail in the amount of $10,000. Hence this petition.2

The Commonwealth advances but one issue for our resolution: Was the order of the trial court proper in light of the decision of this court in Commonwealth v. Fowler, 451 Pa. 505, 304 A.2d 124 (1973). Fowlerdealt with the identical issue presented herein. We acknowledge that the “rule” in Fowleris not without some difficulty of ascertainment; a fractured court of seven members filed five opinions.

The opinion of the court in Fowler, authored by Mr. Justice Nix and joined by Mr. Justice O’Brien and Mr. Justice Pomeroy, re-emphasized our view that persons situated as is respondent have no entitlement to bail: “We hold that bail should not be granted to one convicted of murder in the first degree between the entry of the verdict and the imposition of formal sentence.” Fowler, id.,451 Pa. at 515, 304 A.2d at 129.

We diluted that holding, however, with the observation that “[wjhere there has been an unreasonable delay caused by the Commonwealth and not contributed to by the defense the conviction becomes suspect and the possibility of the innocence of the accused cannot then be ignored.” (Emphasis supplied.)

We went on to say:

“We therefore feel constrained to add a proviso that will assure the disposition of these post-trial proceedings promptly and will avoid the possibility of persons languishing in jail for inordinate lengths of time. . It is our considered judgment that except in extraordinary situations these matters can be disposed of within a period of four months from the date of the entry of the verdict. . We therefore hold if post-trial proceedings in a case of first degree murder are not disposed of and the defendant is not sentenced within the stated four-month period, he may then apply for bail.” Fowler, id.,451 Pa. at 516, 517, 304 A.2d at 130.

*146Mr. Chief Justice Jones filed an opinion concurring in the result and noting his “belief that a person convicted of murder should not be granted bail under any circumstances.” (Concurring opinion 451 Pa. at 517, 304 A.2d at 131.) (Emphasis in original.)

Mr. Justice (now Mr. Chief Justice) Eagen filed a concurring opinion in which he “emphatically objected] to this Court adopting the four month rule . . . (Concurring opinion 451 Pa. at 518, 304 A.2d at 131.)

Mr. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion and Mr. Justice Manderino a dissenting opinion in which both iterated their views that the granting of bail is a decision within the discretion of the trial court.

It may be seen then that three members of this Court in Fowleradhered to the “four month rule”; one believed persons convicted of murder of the first degree were not entitled to bail under any circumstances; one opposed the “four month rule” but did not clarify his views further. But two members viewed the decision as discretionary even short of four months following return of the verdict. It is in this circumstance that the trial court and respondent in the instant case, not incomprehensibly at a loss for guidance, characterize the “four month rule” enunciated in Fowleras obiter dictum.

We note, however, that both the trial court and respondent fail to satisfactorily apprehend an important distinction between Fowlerand the instant case. Fowlerwas decided when the applicable rule of criminal procedure was old Pa.R.Crim.P. 4004(a). That rule provided: “After a verdict of guilty and before sentence is imposed, a defendant shall have the same right to bail as he had before trial . . .” The currently applicable rule is Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010(A), quoted above, and which provides that “The defendant shall not be released on bail upon a finding of guilty of an offense which is punishable by death or life imprisonment. However, if post-verdict motions are not disposed of within a reasonable period of time thereafter, the judge may in his discretion allow bail.”

*147It is clear, then, that notwithstanding the surfeit of views expressed in Fowler, the law now is that in the absence of unreasonable delay between verdict and disposition of post-verdict motions, one convicted of murder of the first degree has no entitlement to bail. This subsequent change in the law has, as a consequence, rendered the views expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Jones, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Manderino inapposite.

What remains for our determination is whether the two months which had elapsed between the return of the verdict and reinstatement of bail in the instant case, in light of the views expressed in Fowlerwhich still retain vitality, constituted such an unreasonable delay as to vest the trial court with discretion to grant the petition.

We reiterate our observation that one convicted of crime is shorn of the presumption of his innocence; rather more than the opposite is true. When such a person stands before the court petitioning for bail, “the countervailing public need to insure that the defendant will remain in custody increases greatly . . . and, when viewed in the context of one convicted of first degree murder, the public interest in detaining the convicted defendant becomes compelling.” Fowler, id.,451 Pa. at 514, 304 A.2d at 129. The only counterweight to this “compelling” interest is “an unreasonable delay caused by the Commonwealth and not contributed to by the defense,” for then “the conviction becomes suspect and the possibility of the innocence of the accused cannot ... be ignored.” Fowler, id.,451 Pa. at 516, 304 A.2d at 130.

We thus take the plurality opinion in Fowlerto mean what it says: Until at least four months’ delay has elapsed between conviction and the disposition of post-verdict motions, and until such delay is shown to have been caused by the Commonwealth and not contributed to by the defense, the trial court has no discretion to grant bail. Applying that holding to the facts of the instant case, the record reveals that neither of the two requisite conditions is *148present. The trial court thus was without discretion to set bail and was in error in doing so.

The Order of the court below, reinstating bail, is reversed.

NIX, J., joins the Opinion of the Court and files a separate concurring opinion in which KAUFFMAN, J., joins.EAGEN, C. J., concurs in the result.LARSEN, J., concurs in the result, believing that bail should not be available to anyone under these circumstances.KAUFFMAN, J., joins NIX, J., in concurring opinion and files a concurring opinion.ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. Murder of the first degree is such a crime. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.

. Although neither party in the instant case has felt constrained to set forth a statement of jurisdiction, Pa.R.A.P. 1762(b) authorizes our disposition of the instant petition.

NIX, Justice,

concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, and write further only to emphasize that the majority’s views are totally consistent with those expressed by the Court in Commonwealth v. Fowler, 451 Pa. 505, 304 A.2d 124 (1973). (Plurality opinion).

In Fowler, the petitioner was convinced by a jury of first degree murder1 and robbery. While his motion for a new *149trial and motion in arrest of judgment were pending, petitioner filed an application for bail. The lower court denied petitioner’s bail application and he applied to this Court for bail.

The issue before this Court was whether an individual convicted of first degree murder and facing a mandatory life sentence has a right to bail pending the disposition of post trial motions. The applicable law in effect at the time provided: Pa.R.Crim.P. 4004

(a) “After a verdict of guilty and before sentence is imposed, a defendant shall have the same right to bail as he had before trial.

(b) After sentence, bail may be allowed in such amount as shall be fixed by the trial judge conditioned upon the defendant perfecting an appeal within twenty days. If an appeal is perfected, such bail shall be effective until final determination of the appeal.”

Although this rule vested absolute discretion in granting bail to the trial judge, we stated that “[i]n the exercise of our supervisory capacity we hold that bail should not be granted to one convicted of murder in the first degree between the entry of the verdict and the imposition of formal sentence.” Id.,451 Pa. at 515, 304 A.2d at 129.

In order to insure a prompt determination of post verdict motions and to avoid the possibility of persons languishing in jail, we added that

*150. if post-trial proceedings in a case of first degree murder are not disposed of and the defendant is not sentenced within the stated four-month period, he may then apply for bail. If the trial judge is convinced at that juncture that the defendant neither caused nor consented to the delay, and is provided reasonable assurance against flight, bail may be granted.” (emphasis added) Id.,451 Pa. at 517, 304 A.2d at 130.

Thus, Fowler restricted the discretion of the trial court in granting bail in first degree murder convictions, prohibiting bail in the first four months preceding conviction, and permitting the trial judge to grant bail in his discretion after the four months had elapsed.

Subsequent to our decision in Fowler, we codified its mandate in Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010 A(l). The rule adopted July 23, 1973, replaced former Rule 4004 and now provides:

(1) Capital and Life Imprisonment Cases. The defendant shall not be released on bail upon a finding of guilty of an offense which is punishable by death or life imprisonment. However, if post-verdict motions are not disposed of within a reasonable period of time thereafter, the judge may in his discretion allow bail.

Rule 4010 prevents the trial judge from immediately releasing on bail those defendants subject to life imprisonment or death sentences. A trial judge’s discretion to grant bail vests only after an unreasonable delay in the disposition of post-verdict motions.

In conclusion, the majority correctly recognized that pursuant to Fowler and Rule 4010, a two-month delay between the verdict and the disposition of post-verdict motions was not sufficient to vest the trial judge with discretion to grant bail.

KAUFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion.

. At the time of Fowler’s conviction, the Pa.Crimes Code divided the crime of murder into two degrees, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a) and (b):

(a) Murder of the first degree. — A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree if the actor is engaged in or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, or kidnapping.

(b) Murder of the second degree. — All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the second degree. Murder of the second degree is a felony of the first degree.

Under the Act of December 6, 1972, a person who had been convicted of a murder of the first degree was sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102. Under the amended current Crimes Code, Act of March 26, 1974, P.L. 213, No. 46, § 4, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502, the offense of murder is divided into three degrees:

*149(a) Murder of the first degree. — A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.

(b) Murder of the second degree. — A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.

(c) Murder of the third degree. — All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a felony of the first degree.

The current Crimes Code also provides that a

. person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment and a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.

Citation profile

Relationships

How this case has been treated — in progress