Appolos v. Brady’s Empirical Analysis
49 F. 401 · 1892
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 1 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 11 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2009
7 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Robson v. Tomlinson · Richmond v. Mississippi Mills · Penzel Co. v. Jett · Bartlett, Reid & Co. v. Teah · Lincoln v. Field
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A mortgage does not invest the mortgagee with an absolute and indefeasible title. The equitable title, called the ’equity of redemption,’ remains in the mortgagor. The mortgage is a security for the debt, and creates a lien upon the property in favor of the creditor. There is no difference in legal effect between a mortgage with a power of sale and a deed of trust executed to secure a debt, where the power of sale is placed in a third person. Both are securities for a debt. Both create specific liens on tlie property; and in both the equitable title or right of redemption remains in the debtor, and is an estate or interest in the property that the debtor may sell, or that may be seized and sold under judicial process l>y his other creditors, subject to tlie lien created by the mortgage or deed of trust. * * * An assignment for the benefit of creditors is well defined to be ‘a transfer by a debtor of some or all of his property to an assignee in trust, to apply tho'same, or the proceeds thereof, to ihe payment of some or all of his debts, and to return the surplus, if any, to the debtor.’ Burrill on Assignment, § 2. The terms of the instrument in this case bring it exactly within this definition, and stamp it as an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and not a mortgage, or deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage. Unlike a mortgage or deed of trust, it was not given by way of security. There is no defeasance clause giving the grantor the right of redemption. It does ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““If the conveyance is to a trustee, and tiie debtor intends to divest himself, not only of the title to the property, but of all control over- it, if it is intended as an absolute conveyance of all of his property, and is made for the purpose of securing a distribution of its proceeds among his creditors, or a portion of them, in legal effect it is an assignment for the benefit of creditors, no matter what name or designation the parties may have given it. On the other hand, if the intention of the debtor is merely to secure his debt to one or more of his creditors, and the conveyance is not intended as an absolute disposition of his property, but he reserves to himself a right therein, the conveyance will be treated as a mortgage, even though the debtor is insolvent at the time, and it covers all his property, and but a portion of his debts are secured by it.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“declare the test to be: Has the party made an absolute appropriation of property as a means for raising a fund to pay debts, without reserving to himself, in good faith, an equity of redemption in the property conveyed ?”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.