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← 49 F.3d 1024 - Fields v. Murray

Fields v. Murray’s Empirical Analysis

49 F.3d 1024 · 1995

Citation profile

62
cited by 62 later decisions
13
states following
April 2024
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 2 district · 22 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 62 later decisions — most recently April 2024 · most notably 15 Cal. 4th 1 - People v. Marshall (1997), Ernest Sutton Bell v. Mack Jarvis Robert Smith (2000)

15 federal appellate · 2 district · 22 state decisions — followed in 13 states

2201995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Faretta v. California · Penson v. Ohio · Wainwright v. Witt · Brown v. Allen · Carnegie v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"The elements of a defendant's self-representation right include `control[ling] the organization and content of his own defense,... mak[ing] motions, ... argu[ing] points of law, ... participat[ing] in the voir dire, ... question[ing] witnesses, and ... address[ing] the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial.' McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174 , 104 S.Ct. at 949 . As in Craig , one of these numerous elements, the right to question, or cross-examine, certain witnesses personally, was denied to Fields while the others would have been preserved. Denying personal cross-examination may have inhibited Fields' dignity and autonomy to some degree by affecting `the jury's perception that [he was] representing himself,' id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 951 , but, as he would have conducted every other portion of the trial, his dignity and autonomy would have been `otherwise assured.' Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 , 110 S.Ct. at 3166 ; see McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182 , 104 S.Ct. at 953 (allowing trial court to require standby counsel for pro se defendant even though it `may erode the dignitary values the right to self-representation is intended to promote'). Similarly, while Fields' ability to present his chosen defense may have been reduced slightly by not being allowed personally to cross-examine the girls, it would have been otherwise assured because he could have personally presented his defense in every other portion of the trial and could even have controlled the cross-examination by specif”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “'traverse . . . a thin line' between improperly allowing the defendant to proceed pro se, thereby violating his right to counsel, and improperly having the defendant proceed without counsel, thereby violating his right to self-representation.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “If a defendant's Confrontation Clause right can be limited in the manner provided in Craig , we have little doubt that a defendant's self-representation right can be similarly limited. While the Confrontation Clause right is guaranteed explicitly in the Sixth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."), the self-representation right is only implicit in that Amendment, Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806 , 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The self-representation right was only firmly established in 1975 in Faretta , and then only over the dissent of three justices, id. at 836 , 95 S.Ct. at 2542 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.). Moreover, it is universally recognized that the self-representation right is not absolute. See , e.g. , McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 176-77, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 950, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) ; Bassette v. Thompson , 915 F.2d 932 , 941 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 , 111 S.Ct. 1639 , 113 L.Ed.2d 734 (1991). .... Fields' self-representation right could have been properly restricted by preventing him from cross-examining personally some of the witnesses against him, which is one "element" of the self-representation right, if, first, the purposes of the self-representation right would have been otherwise assured and, second, the denial of such personal cross-examination was necessary t”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.