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← 49 Kan. App. 2d 845 - State v. Tims

49 Kan. App. 2d 845 - State v. Tims’s Empirical Analysis

2014

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
August 2015
most recently cited

6 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Scott v. Illinois · Nichols v. United States · Alabama v. Shelton · State v. Mossman · State v. Jurdan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The Jackson County District Court found Tims guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol in June 2012. This was not Tims' first DUI. In 2002, Tims executed a DUI diversion agreement in the Topeka Municipal Court. There is no evidence in the record regarding whether Tims successfully completed the diversion; however, Tims malees no claim that he served jail time in connection with his Topeka offense; Tims’ presentence investigation report lists it as a diversion and not a conviction; and since it is the subject of this appeal, we presume the diversion was never revoked and no sentence was imposed. Tims was convicted of another DUI in 2004. “Based upon the 2002 DUI diversion and the 2004 DUI conviction, in 2012 the State charged Tims with felony DUI under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567(a)(5) and (b)(1)(D). Curiously, Tims waived his preliminary hearing then subsequently filed a Motion to Strike Diversion from Consideration of Defendant’s Criminal History and Discharge from Felony Charges. After tire State responded only to the merits of the motion and not its procedural propriety, the district court heard arguments and granted Tims’ motion. The State then filed a motion to reconsider, resulting in a brief hearing and denial by the district court. Thereafter, the parties agreed to a bench trial upon stipulated facts. The State reserved the right to appeal the district court’s sentencing decision based on the court’s exclusion of Tims’ 2002 DUI diversion from his criminal history”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““We mostly agree with the Paletta panel’s conclusions as to the nature of this statutory right. First, we agree that a defendant is not required to have counsel in order to enter into a valid diversion agreement as that right may be knowingly and voluntarily waived. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-2909(a); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 12-4416(a). Second, we agree that this statutory right to counsel does not mandate that counsel be provided because any Kansas statute requiring counsel and requiring die appointment of counsel in case of the defendant’s indigence specifically says so. See, e.g., K.S.A. 12-4405 (some municipal cases); K.S.A. 22-2805(b) (material witness in custody); K.S.A. 22-3104(1) (counsel for inquisition witness); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3428a(2) (annual hearing for committed mentally ill person); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3716(b) (probation revocation hearing); K.S.A. 22-4503(a) and (b) (felony cases); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2205 (parents in CINC case); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 59-29a06(b) (sexual predator commitment proceeding); K.S.A. 59-3063 (proposed ward); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 65-129c(d)(10) (health official ordered isolation or quarantine); see also Supreme Court Rule 183(i) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 278) (right to counsel in K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding where motion presents substantial question of law or triable issue of fact). Third, we express no view as to whether an uncounseled diversion is void in the absence of a valid waiver but would certainly agree that a diversion agreement is not voi”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““(b)(1) Driving under the influence is: [[Image here]] (C) on a third conviction a class A, nonperson misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (b)(1)(D). . . . (D) on a third conviction a nonperson felony if the person has a prior conviction which occurred within the preceding 10 years, not including any period of incarceration. [[Image here]] “(j) For the purpose of determining whether a conviction is a first, second, third, fourth or subsequent conviction in sentencing under this section: (1) 'Conviction’ includes being convicted of a violation of this section or entering into a diversion agreement in lieu of further criminal proceedings on a complaint alleging a violation of this section; (2) ‘conviction’ includes being convicted of a violation of a law of another state or an ordinance of any city, or resolution of any county, which prohibits the acts that this section prohibits or entering into a diversion agreement in lieu of further criminal proceedings in a case alleging a violation of such law, ordinance or resolution; (3) only convictions occurring on or after July 1, 2001, shall be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed for a first, second, third, fourth or subsequent offender . . . .” K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.