49 Md. App. 272 - Bryant v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

46 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[A]lthough we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, ... the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wantland v. State · Radovsky v. State

2. “"When Bryant exercised his right to have counsel present, all interrogation should have ceased. Instead, it was continued by the officer’s using the ploy of keeping him in the same room with [codefendant] Ham, while Ham wrote a statement and also of taking Bryant into a room where the other accused was making a statement. Such action on the part of the police was obviously calculated to underpin the detective’s statement to Bryant that the accomplices had confessed. Patently, the detective was endeavoring to cause Bryant to retreat from the Miranda fortress and to surrender his will to the officer because the battle was lost anyhow. It is precisely that type of 'persuasion,’ duress, coercion, or intimidation that is forbidden by Miranda and Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)].””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 50 Md. App. 547 - Souffie v. State · 575 So. 2d 1 - Berry v. State

3. “"Edwards does not, in our view, expand upon Miranda’s breadth but, rather, serves to underscore that when an accused, arrestee, or suspect, at any custodial questioning, demands his right to have counsel present, all [(emphasis in original)] interrogation must at that point cease until counsel for the accused, arrestee, or suspect is present. Once the right to the presence of counsel has been invoked, the authorities may not thereafter, directly or indirectly, initiate another attempt at interrogation until and unless counsel for the accused, arrestee, or suspect is present. Edwards makes perspicuous that notwithstanding the prior invocation of the Miranda tenet of the right to the presence of counsel, the accused, arrestee, or suspect may validly waive that right provided the accused, arrestee, or suspect, himself, initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.’... See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). The burden of showing a waiver of Miranda rights rests on the prosecution. '[A] valid waiver of . .. [the right to counsel] cannot be established by showing only that .. . [the accused, arrestee, or suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.’ (Footnote omitted.) Edwards v. Arizona, supra.” (Emphasis supplied.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wantland v. State