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49 Mo. 229

Wells v. Moore

Supreme Court of Missouri

Decided January 15, 1872

Supreme Court of Missouri · decided 1872-01-15

I. The decision and final judgment rendered by the Kansas City Court of Common Pleas was rendered upon a special' demurrer to petition, for the reason that-the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This cannot constitute a bar to a subsequent suit for the same cause of-action. (See 21 Pick. 250 ; 10 Pet, 299 ; 12 Curtis’ Dig. 130-3; 21 Ind. 190 ; 12.Mo. 103.; 15 111. 300; 1 Black! 56 ; 6 Black! 56.) II.

Relies on Sherry v. Foresman · Bell v. Hoagland · Brockway v. Kinney

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1872-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently January 1926

11 state decisions

40187218801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Adams, Judge,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court

¶2This was a suit by plaintiff against the defendant as indorser of three several promissory notes, one of which was a negotiable note and the other two non-negotiable.

¶3The only defense relied on was a former judgment on demurrer, rendered in a suit between the same parties in the Kansas City Court of Common Pleas. In the latter suit the defendant demurred to the plaintiff’s petition, and alleged as causes of demurrer certain defects in the petition, and this demurrer was sustained and a final judgment rendered on the demurrer in favor of the defendant. The cause was submitted to the court, and the court decided that the former judgment was a bar to this suit.

¶4It is a well-established principle that where a matter has been once adjudicated on its merits, in a suit between the same parties or their privies, such adjudication is a complete bar to another action. (See Thompson v. Wineland, 11 Mo. 244; 1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 522-3; 11 Mass. 445; 2 Johns. 210; 8 Johns. 383; 9 Johns. 232; 14 Johns. 377.)

¶5But the principle is equally well settled that where the former adjudication was not on the merits, it forms no bar to another action. The merits of this case were not touched by the first judgment. The court did not pretend to decide anything except that the plaintiff’s petition was defective. Whether that decision was right or wrong, it is unnecessary now to inquire. It is sufficient to say that such an adjudication is no bar to another action between these parties. (See Lepping and Kedgewin, 1 Mod. 207; *231Bell v. Hoagland, 15 Mo. 360; 12 Mo. 103; 10 Pet. 299; 12 Curtis, 130-3; 21 Ind. 190; 1 Blackf. 56; 6 Blackf. 56.)

¶6Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.

The other judges concur
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