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49 N.C. 188

Ingram v. . Ingram

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided December 5, 1856

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1856-12-05

<p>The law presumes that every administrator settles up the estate in his hands within two years. In an action, therefore, on agreement to pay a debt when a certain estate is settled, if two years have elapsed from the date of the administration, the plaintiff has a prima fade right to recover, and the burden of showing that the estate was not settled, is thrown on the defendant.</p> <p>An agreement between persons interested in an estate, the consideration of which is not to bid against each other at the administrator's sale, is against the public policy, and void.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1856-12-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently June 1951

1 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

2018561860187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Battle, J.

¶1 "We do not concur with his Honor upon the first ground of objection taken for the defendant, to wit, that the action was commenced too soon. The law required that the estate should be settled up by the administrator within two years, and the presumption is, that he performed his duty, unless the contrary be shown. This, presumption was sufficient to make a prima faeie case for the plaintiff, and throw the burthen on the defendant of proving that the estate of the intestate had not been settled when the writ was issued.

¶2 The second objection is fatal to the action, and upon that, we think that the decision of his Honor was correct. The principle established by the cases of Sharpe v. Farmer, 4 Dev. and Bat. Rep. 122, Ramsay v. Woodard, 3 Jones’ Rep. 508, and Blythe v. Lovingood, 2 Ire. Rep. 20, is directly applicable to the present case. It is that “ the law prohibits every .tiling which is contra bonos mores, and, therefore, no contract which originates in an act contrary to the true principles of morality, can be made the subject of complaint in the courts of justice.” In Blythe v. Lovingood, the contract was declared to be void, because it was founded upon a consideration, by which the State was-to be deprived of a fair price for its land. In the case before us, the consideration of the defendant’s promise was, that the creditors or some of the *190 next of kin of George W. Ingram, deceased, were to be deprived of the fair value of his slaves.

¶3 The objection may seem to come with a very bad grace from the defendant, because she was partieeps ariminis. It is not for her sake that it is allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, of which she has the advantage, contrary to the real justice as between her and the plaintiff. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon a promise, the consideration of which is coniza bo-nos mores, or against the public policy, or laws of the State, or in fraud of the State, or of any third person. See the cases referred to in Blythe v. Lovingood, ubi supra.

¶4 Per Cueiam. The judgment is affirmed.

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