State v. Perryman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

180 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 187 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall do either of the following: “(1) Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code, on or about his person or under his control; “(2) Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on another. “(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated robbery, an aggravated felony of the first degree.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 61 Ohio App. 3d 693 - State v. Johnson · John Boston Hill v. E.P. Perini

2. “[I]n order to convict an offender of complicity, the state need not establish the principal's identity. Pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(C), the state need only prove that a principal committed the offense.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Hill, Unpublished Decision (3-10-2006) · State v. Lipkins

3. “During final arguments, the prosecutor suggested to the jury that the appellant could be held liable as an aider and abettor to the crime. Over appellant’s objection, the court charged on aiding and abetting. Appellant argues such a charge was prejudicial to his rights. Early in the trial, appellant had filed a motion for a bill of particulars. In response, the state had said that the appellant did shoot and kill one Lawrence J. Busch while attempting to commit aggravated robbery. Appellant argues that once the state particularized that the appellant himself had shot and killed Busch, it could not shift its theory of criminal responsibility. In short, appellant concludes that he had a right to be tried, not as an accomplice to the Busch homicide, but as the principal in the first degree. This assignment of error is without merit. Upon an examination of the record, it is evident that the state consistently argued that the appellant was the triggerman. It was only on direct examination of defense witnesses that any evidence of aiding and abetting came before the jury. Since appellant presented evidence from which reasonable men could find him guilty as an aider and abettor, the court’s instruction was, therefore, proper.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. John Boston Hill v. E.P. Perini · State v. White, 23955 (5-21-2008)