Flamer v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1984
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 3 district · 84 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 102 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2019 · most notably State v. Schiebel (1990), McDougall v. North Carolina (1983)
5 federal appellate · 3 district · 84 state decisions — followed in 10 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Glasser v. United States · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Johnson v. Zerbst · Gideon v. Wainwright
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 102 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]he murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman.”
19 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Flamer v. Delaware · Riley v. State“(1) The person intentionally causes the death of another; (2) In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or immediate flight therefrom, the person recklessly causes death of another person; (6) The person, with criminal negligence, causes the death of another person in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of rape, unlawful sexual intercourse in the first or second degree, kidnaping, arson in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, or immediate flight therefrom;....”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[W]e see the defendant as a twenty-five year old male who reached the eleventh grade of school, a convicted felon, and one who at the outset informed the police he knew his rights. There is no contention that he was not on numerous occasions given his constitutionally required rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Nor is there any contention that defendant from the moment of arrest until contact was made with him through the Public Defender’s office, ever attempted to invoke any of the Miranda rights. Instead, when confronted with the physical evidence seized by the police at his home, the blood on the coat he was wearing when he was arrested, the blood under his fingernails, and the articles belonging to the victim Byard Smith taken from one of his companions at the time of arrest, defendant volunteered fictitious stories of his complicity in the crimes while at the same time denying that he was guilty of killing anyone. He first told the police he was home asleep, that Andre Deputy aroused him, and that he went to the murder scene to help Deputy take the fruits of the murder to defendant’s house. Defendant next told the police that he, Johnny Christopher and Andrew Deputy, had gone into the victims’ home, and that it was Johnny who did the stabbing. In the entire record of this case there appears to be no time except initially when he claimed to be home asleep, that defendant denies his participation in the robberie”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.