Simpson v. Norris’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The [.Finley ] Court held that the An-ders requirements were based on an indigent defendant’s ... right to counsel in a first appeal and that those requirements did not apply to the defendant since there was no constitutional right to counsel in a collateral attack on a conviction. The Court rejected the contention that a “right to counsel” created by a state gives rise to a constitutional guar antee: “[I]t is the source of the right to a lawyer’s assistance, combined with the nature of the proceeding, that controls the constitutional question. In this case, respondent’s access to a lawyer is the result of the State’s decision, not the command of the United States Constitution.” Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-56 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 . The Court further explained that “the State has made a valid choice to give prisoners the assistance of counsel [in post-conviction proceedings] without requiring the full panoply of procedural protections that the Constitution requires be given to defendants who are in a fundamentally different position-at trial and on first appeal as of right.” Id. at 559 , 107 S.Ct. 1990 . The Supreme Court has thus left little doubt as to its vieiu that a state’s decision to grant a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings does not give rise to a due process claim if counsel performs defi-ciently.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wooten v. Norris · Gardner v. Garner

2. ““Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 , 312, 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 , 5-6, 112 S.Ct. 1715 , 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). Mr. Simpson has alleged that he is mentally retarded as Atkins defines that condition, which would entitle him to relief, and that matter remains in dispute. Since his inability to present his Atkins claim in state court precluded him from receiving “a full and fair evidentiary hearing” there, he satisfies the conditions outlined in Townsend.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jackson v. Norris

3. “Sasser was not obligated to expand the record with additional evidence showing he was entitled to a hearing, nor was he obligated to file another motion requesting a hearing — Sasser already requested a hearing in his [petition], Simpson explains Sasser [was] entitled to a hearing simply by virtue of “alleging] that he [was] mentally retarded as Atkins defines that condition.” Given the circumstances and factual allegations in Sasser’s case, Simpson expressly requires an Atkins evidentiary hearing, not some other type of “remand procedure” crafted by the district court. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the merits of Sasser’s mental retardation claim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jackson v. Norris