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490 So. 2d 1139

Docket No. KA-4676.

State v. King

STATE of Louisiana v. Yolanda KING.

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Decided June 5, 1986.

Writ Denied October 3, 1986.

Louisiana Court of Appeal · decided 1986-06-05

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“the previous offense, namely second offense prostitution, is a felony by virtue of the fact that it is a second offense, not because the defendant already stands ad-judiciated a felon. Defendant’s prior status was a misdemeanor offender. Thus the violation of R.S. 14:82 a second time becomes the first felony offense. Clearly, that violation is not an enhancement of a prior felony conviction. We therefore hold that in this case the felony offense of second offense prostitution can serve as the basis for enhancement under the Multiple Offender Law. Id. at 1140 (emphasis supplied).”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Caldwell

“... a felony by virture of the fact that it is a second offense, not because the defendant already stands adjudicated a felon.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 496 So. 2d 1103 - State v. Whittaker

Relies on 337 So. 2d 1131 - State v. Sanders · 347 So. 2d 172 - State v. Taylor · 344 So. 2d 1024 - State v. Cox

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1986-06-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently August 2013

8 state decisions

601986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Christina H. Belew, Asst. Dist. Atty., Carl Kafka, Law Clerk, New Orleans, for appellee.

¶2M. Craig Colwart, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for appellant.

¶3Before KLEES, LOBRANO and WARD, JJ.

¶4LOBRANO, Judge.

¶5The State "appeals" the decision of the lower court which quashed the multiple bill filed against defendant pursuant to La.R.S. *1140 15:529.1. Because the State has no right of appeal because the multiple offender bill of information does not charge a substantive crime, but merely enhance the penalty, we treat this matter as an application of supervisory writs. See, State v. Sanders, 337 So.2d 1131 (La.1976).

¶6After review of the arguments of all parties, we grant the State's writ application, and reverse the trial court's decision.

¶7Defendant's present felony conviction is for violating La.R.S. 14:89, crime against nature. For that offense, she was sentenced to serve twenty (20) months at hard labor. The State subsequently filed a multiple bill, pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1, to enhance the penalty of defendant's present conviction. As a predicate offense, the State used defendant's previous conviction of second offense prostitution, a violation of La.R.S. 14:82.

¶8Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court quashed the multiple bill.

¶9Defendant argues that the holdings of State v. Cox, 344 So.2d 1024 (La.1977), State v. Taylor, 347 So.2d 172 (La.1977) and State v. Siegel, 354 So.2d 525 (La.1978) support the trial court's ruling. We disagree. Those cases involved convicted felons who were subsequently convicted of violations of La.R.S. 14:110(A)(1). In all three cases, either the current offense (Cox) or the previous offense (Taylor and Siegel) were offenses which enhanced previous felony convictions. Thus, for the State to have employed La.R.S. 15:529.1 to further enhance would have amounted to double enhancement, once under La.R.S. 14:110(A) and again under La.R.S. 15:529.1.

¶10However, in the instant case, the previous offense, namely second offense prostitution, is a felony by virtue of the fact that it is a second offense, not because the defendant already stands adjudicated a felon. Defendant's prior status was a misdemeanor offender. Thus the violation of R.S. 14:82 a second time becomes the first felony offense. Clearly, that violation is not an enhancement of a prior felony conviction. We therefore hold that in this case the felony offense of second offense prostitution can serve as the basis for enhancement under the Multiple Offender Law.

¶11Accordingly, the order of the trial court granting the motion to quash is reversed and this matter is remanded.

¶12REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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