490 So. 2d 852 - Cabello v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
36 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently November 2012 · most notably McFee v. State (1987), 671 So. 2d 581 - Walker v. State (1995)
36 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Jackson v. Denno · 451 So. 2d 743 - Neal v. State · 481 So. 2d 203 - Fisher v. State · Johnson v. State · 471 So. 2d 332 - Cabello v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[w]here the trial court has overruled a motion to suppress the confession of a defendant, this Court will reverse the trial court's decision only if the trial court's ruling `is manifestly in error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.'”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage“In order for a confession to be admitted into evidence, it must have been given freely and voluntarily, and without the influence of promises or threats. Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345 (Miss. 1986). A confession which in truth is not voluntary, which comes about as a result of threat, physical mistreatment, or the promise of reward, cannot be used either for the State's case in chief or for impeachment purposes. Powell v. State, 483 So.2d 363 (Miss. 1986). "[W]here a criminal defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, he has a due process right to a reliable determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily given." Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1985). See also, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). In a hearing to determine the admissibility of a confession, the trial judge is the trier of fact and is charged with determining whether there has been, under the totality of the circumstances, a knowing and voluntary waiver of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d at 954 . See also, Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686, 696 (Miss. 1984); Depreo v. State, 407 So.2d 102, 106 (Miss. 1981). "[T]he State has the burden of proving all facts prerequisite to admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt." Gavin, 473 So.2d at 954 . "Age and intelligence level factors to be considered in determining whether a waiver and a confession are free and voluntary, but are not controlling." Coleman v. Stat”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[A] motion for change of venue ordinarily should be granted where, under the totality of the circumstances it appears reasonably likely that, in the absence of such relief, the accused's right to a fair trial may be lost.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.