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490 S.W.2d 828

Stanley v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided December 6, 1972

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1972-12-06

Relies on Furman v. Georgia · 267 So. 2d 8 - Anderson v. State · Whan v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1972-12-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently August 2013

2 federal appellate · 11 state decisions

14019721980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

¶2These cases come to us on remand from the United States Supreme Court. All appellants were convicted of murder with malice except for Smith and Branch, who were convicted of rape, and punishment was assessed at death. These convictions have all been affirmed by this Court.1 In Furman v. Georgia (Branch v. Texas), 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346(1972), the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty, as currently imposed, is unconstitutional.

¶3Subsequently, Governor Preston Smith, acting upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, has granted each appellant a commutation of sentence, from death to life imprisonment.

¶4Appellants now contend that since the judgment was vacated by the United States Supreme Court, there exists no procedure to validly sentence them and, therefore, we should either grant them a new trial, permit them to be re-sentenced by a jury, or release them from custody.

¶5We disagree. The Governor’s commutation is valid. We are cognizant of the due process argument raised by appellants. The contention is that appellants have been deprived of their right to have a jury assess the punishment. We are not swayed by the out-of-state cases cited by appellants in support of their argument. See Anderson v. State, 267 So.2d 8 (Fla., 1972); In re Baker, 267 So.2d 331 (Fla.,1972); Huggins v. Commonwealth, Va., 191 S.E.2d 734 (1972); Beaver v. State, 475 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn.Sup.Ct.1971). We are further aware of appellants’ argument that when the Governor and Board of Pardons and Paroles acted to commute the sentences, they did so without notifying appellants or their attorneys and thus denied them the right to be heard. Such a notification procedure is not necessary to effectuate either the Governor’s or the Board’s powers.

¶6There is no reason to conclude that the Governor’s constitutionally granted commutation powers are rendered invalid in such cases. This Court only recently dealt with this problem and we see no reason to depart from that holding. See Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

¶7The order of the Supreme Court is satisfied.

¶8The judgments are affirmed.

*831ODOM, J., not participating in David and Tea.DOUGLAS, J., not participating in Branch, Wright and Smith.

¶9. See Stanley v. State, 471 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Thames v. State, 453 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Curry v. State, 468 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); David v. State, 453 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Wright v. State, 422 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Smith v. State, 437 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Tea v. State, 453 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Matthews v. State, 471 S.W.2d 834 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Morales v. State, 458 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); and Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).

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