Cole v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Nearly fifty years later, the Court in McNeely held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream did not create a per se exigency justifying an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for noncon-sensual blood testing. The McNeely Court held firm to the warrant requirement by stating that “where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so,” Yet the Court still recognized the gravity of the body’s natural metabolic process and the attendant evidence destruction over time. With this balance in mind, the Court adhered to a totality of the circumstances analysis with the notion that certain circumstances may permit a war-rantless search of a suspect’s blood. The narrow issue before the Court prohibited it from providing an exhaustive analysis of when exigency in intoxication related offenses may be found. However, the Court provided insight on the issue by identifying a few relevant circumstances that may establish exigency in this context. In addition to the body’s metabolization, they include “the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant, “the availability of a magistrate judge,” and “the practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cosino v. State

2. “Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred to this case as “unquestionably a routine .DWI. case,” the fact that a particular drunk-driving stop is “routine” in the sense that it does not involve “ ‘special facts,’ ” sueh as the need for the police. to attend to a car accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious way and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. The relevant factors in determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in the case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cosino v. State

3. “We review a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. First, we afford al most total deference to a trial judge’s determination of historical facts. The judge is the sole trier- of fact and judge of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. When findings of fact are not entered, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judge’s ruling and assume the judge made implicit findings of fact that support the ruling as [long as] the record supports those findings. Second, we review a judge’s application of the law to the facts de novo. We will sustain the judge’s ruling if the record reasonably supports that ruling and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cosino v. State