¶2Gary Wayne Karr was convicted of receiving stolen property in the first degree: a violation of § 13A-8-17, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to ten years' imprisonment.
¶3The evidence showed that on Wednesday, January 20, 1982, John Pate purchased at wholesale $3,360 worth of lumber from a lumberyard in Mississippi. The check given by Pate in payment of the lumber was worthless, and it was eventually returned marked "Account Closed." The next day, Mr. Pate met Kenneth Holmes at a local truck stop, and sold him the lumber for $3,500. This purchaser, Mr. Holmes, then asked the appellant, Gary Wayne Karr, to find a place to store the lumber, and to help unload it. Karr arranged for a place and had the lumber unloaded there. The record discloses that Karr had made attempts to contact the forklift operator who unloaded the lumber on the day the lumber was "purchased" in Mississippi. This was the day before Mr. Holmes sought his assistance in securing the property, and suggests prior knowledge and a greater participation by him.
¶5The receiving stolen property statutes are §§ 13A-8-16 through 13A-8-19, Code of Alabama 1975. Immediately following those statutes, §§ 13A-8-20 and 13A-8-21, Code of Alabama (1975), respectively, prohibit bringing into this state stolen property or property obtained by false pretenses. In interpreting the predecessor to those statutes, our Supreme Court said the following:
Murray v. State, 18 Ala. 727, 731 (1851). We hold, based onMurray v. State, that it is not necessary to prove the taking was unlawful under the law of the state where the property was taken, only that it was unlawful under Alabama law. It is not contested that the lumber was stolen property according to Alabama law.¶6 "The next inquiry is, whether it was necessary to introduce the laws of Louisiana, to show that the taking would have constituted a larceny in that State. It is manifest that it is not the crime committed in Louisiana, that our Statute intended to punish; neither our courts, nor our Legislature have power beyond the limits of our State; we can neither define, nor punish crimes committed against the laws of another country; but we can define and punish crimes committed here. It is not, therefore, the larceny *1075 committed in Louisiana that constitutes the offence, but it is the bringing of the stolen property into this State. We have the right to forbid this, and may punish for the violation of our law commanding that it shall not be done. — The State v. Seay, 3 Stew. 123 [20 Am.Dec. 66]. Whether, therefore, the felonious taking of the property of another in the State of Louisiana be criminally punished in that state or not, is immaterial; but the inquiry here is, whether the property was taken in Louisiana under such circumstances, as would constitute larceny in this State, if the act was committed here. If the taking in Louisiana would amount to larceny according to our laws, and the property be brought feloniously into this state, the crime is complete, without regard to the laws of Louisiana."
¶9AFFIRMED.
¶10All the Judges concur.