Fogg v. Gonzales’s Empirical Analysis
492 F.3d 447 · 2007
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 23 district · 6 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 717 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 703 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 706 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
Relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins · Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill · Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“discrimination or retaliation played a 'motivating part' or was a 'substantial factor’ in the employment decision ... without proving that an impermissible consideration was the sole or but-for motive for the employment action.” Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 18, 19 (D.C.Cir.2005)). In a mixed-motive case, the defendant may offer a”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“demonstrates that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Ms. Banks presents two theories as to how the USDA intentionally discriminated against her.... To show that ... sex was a determinative factor , the plaintiff must show that if not for her ... sex, the defendant would not have made its employment decision about her.... ... [Y]ou should find for Ms. Banks if you find that the USDA's explanation is not the true reason and that but for intentional discrimination based on Ms. Banks's ... sex, the USDA would not have removed Ms. Banks from her SES position in 2000. To show that ... sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision, the plaintiff .... must only prove that her ... sex played an actual or substantial role in the defendant's decisions even though other factors may also have motivated the defendant. .... In order for you to find for the plaintiff, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more USDA officials intentionally discriminated against her.... .... If you find that ... sex was a determinative factor in the defendant's decision ... then you must determine an amount that is fair compensation for the plaintiff's damages. If you find that the plaintiff's ... sex was a motivating, but not a determinative factor in the defendant's employment decision, then you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is not entitled to damages if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have treated the plaintiff the same even if the plain”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Banks v. Perdue
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.