Commonwealth v. Wadzinski’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “state regulation whose scope is limited to false campaign statements knowingly or recklessly made may be sustained.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Miller · Rickert v. State, Public Disclosure Com'n

2. “It follows ... that any state law regulating campaign speech requires, in the face of a properly presented First Amendment challenge, the most exacting judicial scrutiny. This is not to say, however, that any attempt to regulate this subject matter is automatically unconstitutional. First, it is clear that not all speech uttered during the course of a political campaign is constitutionally protected. “[T]he use of the known lie as a tool [for political ends] is at once at odds with the premises of a democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social or political change is to be effected.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 , 85 S.Ct. 209, 221 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Calculated falsehoods delivered during a campaign are accordingly subject to no greater constitutional immunity than such statements receive when made in other contexts. It is thus clear that a state may apply its general laws of defamation to political speech in order to protect the reputational interests of its citizens so long as such laws comport with the “actual malice” standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, supra. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 , 91 S.Ct. 628 28 L.Ed.2d 57 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, supra. Likewise, state regulation whose scope is limited to false campaign statements knowingly or recklessly made may be sustained. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra (emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Miller

3. “— the first Amendments guarantee of freedom of expression has long been among our most fundamental and carefully guarded rights. ‘Whatever the explanation for the ascendancy of the First Amendment protection, courts have remained particularly sensitive to government regulation that tends to impinge on expressive freedom.” Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 496 F.2d 164 , (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 , 95 S.Ct. 77 , 42 L.Ed.2d 72 (1974). — There is practically universal agreement that free discussion of candidates for political office is essential to the functioning of a democratic society. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 , 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1436-37 , 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). — Such discussions are afforded “the broadest protection” in order to “assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 , 96 S.Ct. 612, 632 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). — This broad grant of protection reflects our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 , 84 S.Ct. 710, 720 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). — Accordingly, the First Amendment guarantee of free speech “has its fullest and most urgent application to the conduct of campaigns for public office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 , 91 S.Ct. 621, 625 , 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Miller